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MONTANA V. WYOMING:  
AN OPPORTUNITY TO RIGHT  
THE COURSE FOR COALBED  
METHANE DEVELOPMENT  
AND PRIOR APPROPRIATION 
MICHELLE BRYAN MUDD* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Across vast swathes of western lands, coalbed methane (CBM) 
wells dot the landscape, pumping out billions of gallons of groundwater 
to release natural gases trapped within subterranean coal seams.1 These 
coal seams interlace complex networks of underground aquifers, many of 
which share a relationship with overlying surface waters. In Wyoming, 
Montana, and other western states, these CBM wells are developed 
largely outside of the traditional prior appropriation system, with little or 
no review of how water rights may be affected. These CBM wells are 
also developed under state laws that give little consideration to the 
* Associate Professor and Director of the Land Use Clinic, University of Montana School of Law. I 
dedicate this Article to the peoples of Montana and Wyoming—two great states that I have had the 
opportunity to call home—whose hard work and love of place have inspired my own endeavors. My 
thanks to research assistants Nicholas Gochis and Andrew Gorder for their valuable assistance. This 
piece benefitted from the careful editing of my colleague Bari Burke and the insights of attorneys 
DarAnne Dunning and Jack Tuholske. My thanks as well to Bill Woessner, Professor of 
Geohydrology, for his guidance on matters of science. 
 1 For technical background on CBM production, see NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE 
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, MANAGEMENT AND EFFECTS OF COALBED METHANE 
PRODUCED WATER IN THE UNITED STATES 11–12, 19–24 (2010) [hereinafter COALBED METHANE 
PRODUCED WATER], available at www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=12915; GARY BRYNER, 
COALBED METHANE DEVELOPMENT IN THE INTERMOUNTAIN WEST: PRIMER 5–7, 13–16 (July 2002) 
[hereinafter CBM PRIMER], available at www.colorado.edu/law/centers/nrlc/publications/ 
CBM_Primer.pdf. 
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interstate nature of the affected waters.2 Commentators have called for a 
more cohesive CBM regulatory regime that protects water rights users, 
and the law has experienced incremental changes. But change has been 
slow, and the present reality is that western states are enabling CBM 
development without a true understanding of how CBM groundwater 
withdrawals impact both underground and surface water supplies. With 
tremendous pressures to develop CBM as a principal fuel source,3 and 
technical complexities that obscure our understanding of the CBM-water 
relationship, the problem appears intractable, yet deeply in need of 
reform. 
Herein lies the significance of the current United States Supreme 
Court litigation between Montana and Wyoming.4 The case centers upon 
the interstate waters of the Powder River Basin (the Basin), home to one 
of the largest and fastest developing CBM reserves in the nation.5 The 
Basin, nestled within the Yellowstone River system, contains an 
estimated 18,000 CBM wells collectively pumping somewhere between 
30 and 110 billion gallons of water each year, predominantly on the 
Wyoming side.6 Among its several allegations in Montana v. Wyoming, 
Montana alleges that Wyoming’s substantial CBM withdrawals are 
depleting surface waters that belong to Montana under the 1950 
Yellowstone River Compact (the Compact).7 
Some sixty years ago, when the Compact’s negotiators were 
 2 See COALBED METHANE PRODUCED WATER, supra note 1, at 20 fig.2.1 (depicting several 
major coalbed methane basins that straddle state lines in Montana, Wyoming, Utah, Colorado, and 
New Mexico); see also CBM PRIMER, supra note 1, at 7–8 figs.5, 6. 
 3 COALBED METHANE PRODUCED WATER, supra note 1, at 13 (“Natural gas has been 
described as a principal transition fuel to a less carbon-intensive U.S. energy portfolio.”); CBM 
PRIMER, supra note 1, at 1 (describing CBM as “one of the most important and valuable natural 
resources” and “a central element of the national goal of a secure supply of energy”); see also CBM 
PRIMER, supra note 1, at 13 fig.9 (setting out CBM development revenues earned by state and local 
governments). 
 4 See Montana v. Wyoming, 131 S. Ct. 1765 (2011) (No. 137, Orig.) (Opinion on Exception 
to Report of Special Master). All of the litigation documents referenced in this Article are located 
online at: www.supremecourt.gov/Search.aspx?FileName=/docketfiles/22o137.htm (U.S. Supreme 
Court docket) and www.stanford.edu/dept/law/mvn/ (Special Master docket). 
 5 See COALBED METHANE PRODUCED WATER, supra note 1, at 15 fig.1.4; see also CBM 
PRIMER, supra note 1, at 1, 8. The Powder River Basin includes the Tongue and Powder Rivers. 
 6 Estimates vary. See COALBED METHANE PRODUCED WATER, supra note 1, at 34 tbl.2.1 
(citing a 30 billion gallon figure based on 2008 data provided by the State of Wyoming); see also 
CBM Primer, supra note 1, at 15 (supporting a 100 billion gallon figure based on estimates of 
average CBM well flows in the Basin being between 12–15 gallons per minute, which roughly 
translates to 17,000–21,000 gallons per day, multiplied over 18,000 wells). Additional monthly 
calculations on the Wyoming side are provided in note 74, infra. 
 7 See Montana’s Bill of Complaint ¶ 11, Montana v. Wyoming, 131 S. Ct. 1765 (2011) (No. 
137, Orig.). The official citation for the Compact is YELLOWSTONE RIVER COMPACT, Pub. L. No. 
82-231, 65 Stat. 663 (1951) [hereinafter YELLOWSTONE RIVER COMPACT]. 
2
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dividing the interstate waters of the Yellowstone River system, they had 
little inkling that CBM development would later transform the landscape 
of the Powder River Basin. Their focus was instead on the paramount 
importance of irrigated agriculture to the survival of the arid region. 
Arriving at what they believed to be an equitable division of waters, the 
States of Wyoming, Montana, and North Dakota expressly adopted the 
doctrine of prior appropriation to govern the uses of water under the 
Compact.8 The Montana v. Wyoming litigation thus confronts the same 
issue with which the western states are grappling: Can CBM 
development regulations be made consistent with traditional prior 
appropriation principles? 
The U.S. Supreme Court recently issued its first ruling in Montana 
v. Wyoming,9 addressing the separate question of whether the prior 
appropriation doctrine accommodates Wyoming irrigators who upgrade 
their irrigation efficiencies and reduce historic return flows to Montana.10 
While the Supreme Court has not yet ruled on Montana’s CBM claim, its 
appointed Special Master11 Barton H. Thompson has issued some 
threshold legal conclusions. Importantly, he has concluded that 
groundwater withdrawals are within the scope of the Compact and that 
Wyoming would be in violation of the Compact if it is allowing CBM 
groundwater withdrawals to deplete surface waters belonging to 
Montana.12 The Special Master’s conclusions, which Wyoming chose 
not to appeal,13 create significant repercussions for Wyoming CBM 
 8 These Compact provisions are discussed in Part I.A, infra. 
 9 See Montana v. Wyoming, 131 S. Ct. 1765 (2011) (No. 137, Orig.) (Opinion on Exception 
to Report of Special Master). 
 10 For a discussion of this ruling, see the companion article, Lawrence J. MacDonnell, 
Montana v. Wyoming: Sprinklers, Irrigation Water Use Efficiency, and the Doctrine of Recapture, 5 
GOLDEN GATE U. ENVTL. L.J. 265 (2012). 
 11 See Order Appointing Barton H. Thompson, Esquire, of Stanford California, as Special 
Master, Montana v. Wyoming, 131 S. Ct. 1765 (2011) (No. 137, Orig.) [hereinafter Order 
Appointing Barton H. Thompson]. For a discussion of the role of Special Masters in original U.S. 
Supreme Court proceedings, see generally Anne-Marie C. Carstens, Lurking in the Shadows of 
Judicial Process: Special Masters in the Supreme Court's Original Jurisdiction Cases, 86 MINN. L. 
REV. 625 (2002). 
 12 See First Interim Report of the Special Master at 89–90, Montana v. Wyoming, 131 S. Ct. 
1765 (2011) (No. 137, Orig.) [hereinafter First Interim Report]. Because this conclusion was reached 
in ruling on Wyoming’s Motion to Dismiss, the Special Master has decided only the legal question 
of whether such activities would constitute an actionable violation of the Compact. The question of 
whether actual violations are occurring may be resolved only after discovery and further fact finding 
proceedings in the case. Id. 
 13 Because Wyoming did not challenge these conclusions by the Court’s deadline for filing 
exceptions, it is assumed that the issue is finally resolved and has become the law of the case. As a 
procedural formality, however, the Court likely must still adopt the Special Master’s conclusion. See 
Carstens, supra note 11, at 656 (“[W]hile the Special Master's reports and recommendations are 
advisory only, the Court usually enters the Master's recommendation as its order if neither of the 
3
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development, and arguably Montana CBM development as well. The 
Special Master will next consider whether Wyoming’s CBM 
groundwater pumping is indeed depleting surface water supplies, and if 
so, what remedies are appropriate to address the Compact violations.14 
These remaining questions create an important opportunity to usher in 
regulatory changes that ensure CBM development does not undermine 
the Compact’s division of waters—regulatory changes that may serve as 
a signpost for the other western states as well. 
Part I of this Article provides a brief background on the 
Yellowstone River Compact and the Montana v. Wyoming litigation. 
This part further explains the Special Master’s analysis of the CBM 
issue, as well as the Supreme Court’s recent ruling on improved 
irrigation efficiency. When viewed together, these decisions provide an 
important framework for determining how the parties’ regulation of 
CBM development should proceed. Part II then describes the magnitude 
of the CBM groundwater pumping issue and asserts that the posture of 
the Montana v. Wyoming case provides a unique opportunity not only to 
set Powder River Basin CBM development on the right course for 
Compact compliance, but also to more broadly right the course for how 
prior appropriation and CBM development work together in the western 
states. If this opportunity is not seized, there is great potential for harm to 
water users throughout the West, some of which may be irreversible and 
may not be redressed under current state laws. Focusing on the remedy 
aspect of the litigation, Part III then discusses the steps that the Special 
Master—or the parties in a settlement process—can take to design a 
comprehensive CBM regulatory process that upholds the principles of 
prior appropriation. These steps include invalidating those aspects of the 
States’ current CBM regulations that fail to comply with the Compact 
and requiring new, science-based regulatory features that prospectively 
protect water rights users. 
The Article concludes that the Yellowstone River Compact dispute, 
and like disputes throughout the West, cannot be fully resolved without a 
new regulatory process for CBM development that prospectively 
addresses harms to water rights. Ultimately, this interstate dispute 
provides a rare and critical lens for all prior appropriation states 
state parties file a formal objection.”). 
 14 While a possibility exists that the Special Master may ultimately find there is no surface 
water depletion from CBM groundwater pumping, the available hydrogeologic data suggests 
otherwise. See discussion in Parts II and III.B, infra. To the extent the evidence is inconclusive, this 
Article argues that the Special Master should order further studies and monitoring as part of the 
remedy in the case, taking a precautionary approach to avoid irreversible harms to the water supply. 
See discussion in Part III, infra. 
4
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grappling with how to adapt traditional appropriative rights principles to 
the emerging use of CBM development. 
II. TAKING GUIDANCE FROM THE U.S. SUPREME COURT AND SPECIAL 
MASTER RULINGS IN THE CASE 
In 2007 the U.S. Supreme Court accepted original jurisdiction in 
Montana v. Wyoming to resolve allegations that Montana has made 
against Wyoming under the 1950 Yellowstone River Compact, an 
agreement that covers the interstate waters of the Powder River Basin, 
including the Tongue and Powder Rivers at issue in the litigation.15 As is 
the tradition in interstate water disputes, the Supreme Court appointed a 
Special Master—in this case noted water law Professor Barton H. 
Thompson, Jr.—to hear evidence and make recommended rulings to the 
Supreme Court.16 
Montana alleges that Wyoming is allowing several types of water 
uses, including CBM groundwater pumping,17 that have resulted in the 
illegal taking of water belonging to Montana under the Compact.18 To 
support its allegations, Montana points to data on the Tongue and 
Powder Rivers showing declines in the amount of water that has 
historically crossed into Montana.19 While the Special Master has 
addressed several aspects of Montana’s claims,20 the Supreme Court has 
ruled on only one claim thus far―that Wyoming has illegally “allowed 
the consumption of water on existing irrigated acreage . . . to be 
increased” through the use of upgrades in irrigation efficiency, thereby 
 15 Although the State of North Dakota is also a signatory of the Compact and is thus named 
in the litigation, Montana has not made claims against North Dakota. Montana’s Brief in Support of 
Motion for Leave to File Bill of Complaint at 3, Montana v. Wyoming, 131 S. Ct. 1765 (2011) (No. 
137, Orig.) [hereinafter Montana’s Brief in Support]. The Powder River Basin, which contains the 
Powder and Tongue Rivers, is a subbasin nested within the Yellowstone River Basin. See Water 
Resources Division, Montana Department of Natural Resources and Conservation, Yellowstone 
River Basin Map, dnrc.mt.gov/wrd/water_mgmt/water_reservations/yellowstone_riv_basin/ 
yrb_reliefmap.asp (last visited Mar. 12, 2012). For a fuller discussion of the background of the 
Montana v. Wyoming case and the Yellowstone River Compact, see Melosa Granda, A Water Story 
With Original Jurisdiction, and a Doctrine for Changing Uses, 5 GOLDEN GATE U. ENVTL. L.J. 257 
(2012); see also First Interim Report, supra note 12, at 1–12. 
 16 See Order Appointing Barton H. Thompson, supra note 11. 
 17 Other allegations not addressed in this Article include the illegal expansion of irrigated 
acreage, illegal permitting of groundwater wells for irrigation and other uses, and illegal enlargement 
or new construction of water storage facilities. See Bill of Complaint, supra note 7, ¶¶ 9–11. 
 18 See generally Bill of Complaint, supra note 7. 
 19 See generally Joint Appendix 0317-0498, Montana v. Wyoming, 131 S. Ct. 1765 (2011) 
(No. 137, Orig.) (containing annual reports to the Yellowstone River Compact Commission that 
comparatively show a decline in water supply to Montana). 
 20 See generally First Interim Report, supra note 12. 
5
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diminishing return flows available to Montana (the “improved irrigation 
efficiency” allegation).21 In his First Interim Report, the Special Master 
concluded that Wyoming irrigators can upgrade their irrigation 
efficiency without violating the Compact, so long as they are using the 
conserved water to irrigate lands already under irrigation.22 Montana 
filed an exception to this conclusion,23 and the Supreme Court affirmed 
the Special Master in its Opinion on Exception to Report of Special 
Master.24 
More favorably for Montana, the Special Master also concluded that 
the Compact, which is silent concerning groundwater, nonetheless covers 
groundwater hydrologically connected to surface water in the Basin; 
further, that Wyoming CBM groundwater pumping violates the Compact 
if it takes surface water away from Montana water users.25 Wyoming did 
not file an exception to this conclusion, so the issue did not reach the 
Supreme Court for oral argument.26 Remaining before the Special Master 
are questions of whether Wyoming’s CBM development is depleting 
Montana’s surface water supplies and, if so, what remedies are 
appropriate to address these violations.27 
The Supreme Court’s Opinion on Exception to Report of Special 
Master provides important guidance on how Wyoming’s CBM 
groundwater withdrawals should be analyzed under the Compact. 
Notably, the Supreme Court has concluded that the Compact is subject to 
the doctrine of prior appropriation, as defined through a comparative 
analysis of the water laws of the western states. If a similar analysis is 
applied to the CBM groundwater issue, it is likely Wyoming’s conduct 
will be found to violate the no-waste and no-injury rules of prior 
appropriation. 
 
 
 
 21 See Bill of Complaint, supra note 7, ¶ 12; see also Montana’s Exception and Brief at 7–8, 
Montana v. Wyoming, 131 S. Ct. 1765 (2011) (No. 137, Orig.); Montana v. Wyoming, 131 S. Ct. 
1765, 1170 n.1 (2011) (No. 137, Orig.) (Opinion on Exception to Report of Special Master). 
 22 See First Interim Report, supra note 12, at 86-88. 
 23 See Montana’s Exception and Brief, supra note 21, at 21–25. 
 24 See Montana v. Wyoming, 131 S. Ct. 1765, 1769 (2011) (No. 137, Orig.) (Opinion on 
Exception to Report of Special Master). 
 25 See First Interim Report, supra note 12, at 89–90. 
 26 For a discussion on the likely procedural posture of this issue, see supra note 12. 
 27 See id., at 2. 
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A. THE SUPREME COURT’S CONCLUSION THAT THE LAWS OF PRIOR 
APPROPRIATION IMBUE THE COMPACT 
The operative language of the Yellowstone River Compact begins 
in Article V(A): 
Appropriative rights to the beneficial uses of the water of the 
Yellowstone River System existing in each signatory State as of 
January 1, 1950, shall continue to be enjoyed in accordance with the 
laws governing the acquisition and use of water under the doctrine of 
appropriation.28 
Article V(B) of the Compact then proceeds to describe how the 
States will apportion the unused and unappropriated waters after January 
1, 1950, for either (1) supplemental water supplies on existing irrigated 
lands or (2) water storage or direct diversions for beneficial uses on new 
lands.29 These supplemental appropriations are also “to be acquired and 
enjoyed in accordance with the laws governing the acquisition and use of 
water under the doctrine of appropriation.”30 
The Compact waters are thus divided between existing pre-1950 
water rights and water uses developed after 1950. Whereas Montana’s 
improved irrigation efficiency allegation targeted Wyoming’s misuse of 
pre-1950 water rights, Montana’s CBM groundwater pumping allegation 
targets Wyoming’s misuse of water that was developed after the 
Compact was ratified. Nonetheless, as argued below, the Compact 
subjects both pre- and post-1950 waters to prior appropriation 
principles.31 
The Compact also defines key terms used in Article V, including: 
Beneficial Use: “[T]hat use by which the water supply of a drainage 
basin is depleted when usefully employed by the activities of man.” 
 
Divert and Diversion: “[T]he taking or removing of water from the 
Yellowstone River or any tributary thereof when the water so taken or 
removed is not returned directly into the channel of the Yellowstone 
River or of the tributary from which it is taken.” 
 
Yellowstone River System: “[T]he Yellowstone River and all of its 
tributaries, including springs and swamps, from their sources to the 
 28 See YELLOWSTONE RIVER COMPACT, supra note 7. 
 29 Id. art. V(B). 
 30 Id. 
 31 See discussion infra Part III.A. 
7
Mudd: Coalbed Methane Development
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2012
   
304 GOLDEN GATE UNIV. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW J. [Vol. 5 
 
mouth of the Yellowstone River . . . .” 
 
Tributary: “[A]ny stream which in a natural state contributes to the 
flow of the Yellowstone River, including interstate tributaries and 
tributaries thereof . . . .”32 
Also important is the Compact’s statement that the parties intend to 
“provide for an equitable division and apportionment” of the waters in 
the Yellowstone River System and “to remove all causes of present and 
future controversy” concerning those waters.33 
The Compact provisions between Montana and Wyoming are 
administered by the Yellowstone River Compact Commission (Compact 
Commission), comprised of one Montana representative, one Wyoming 
representative, and one representative from the federal government.34 
Although there is a dispute resolution process involving the Compact 
Commission, that body was unable to resolve the existing dispute 
between the States because it deadlocked in a 1:1 vote, with the U.S. 
representative abstaining.35 This gridlock evidences the parties’ inability 
to negotiate a settlement of their differences. 
In its Opinion on Exception to Report of Special Master, the 
Supreme Court—in a 7:1 decision36—began with the general proposition 
that “[a]s with all contracts, we interpret the compact according to the 
intent of the parties, here the signatory States.”37 The Supreme Court 
then held that Article V(A) of the Compact directly incorporates the 
doctrine of prior appropriation.38 Therefore, even though the parties are 
subject to the negotiated terms of the Compact, there are nonetheless 
common law water principles that will be read into the document. Next, 
the Supreme Court proceeded to consult case law from prior 
appropriation states and treatises summarizing appropriative rights 
principles.39 This approach makes sense from the perspective of 
understanding what the intent of the signatory States was when they used 
 32 See YELLOWSTONE RIVER COMPACT, supra note 7, arts. II(D), (E), (G) and (H). 
 33 Id. pmbl. 
 34 Id. art. III. 
 35 See Montana’s Brief in Support, supra note 15, at 26-27 (“Montana brings its claims after 
many years of attempting to resolve fundamental differences with Wyoming on matters of Compact 
interpretation. In the absence of a resolution by agreement between the States, only this Court can 
resolve the dispute. . . . [T]he states are deadlocked over threshold legal questions regarding the 
proper interpretation of the Compact.”). 
 36 Justice Scalia dissented and Justice Kagan did not participate. Montana v. Wyoming, 131 
S. Ct. 1765, 1779 (2011) (No. 137, Orig.) (Opinion on Exception to Report of Special Master). 
 37 Id. at 1771–72 n.4. 
 38 Id. at 1772. 
 39 Id. at 1772–77. 
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the phrase “doctrine of appropriation.” 
There are, however, difficulties attendant with incorporating 
common law principles into a compact. Foremost among them is the 
reality that common law, including water law, is by its very nature an 
evolving universe of norms. It is not entirely clear whether the parties 
intended to incorporate the common law at the time of the Compact or 
the evolving principles of common law over time. The Supreme Court 
noted this dilemma in its Opinion on Exception to Report of Special 
Master: 
The States appear to have assumed that the doctrine has not changed 
in a way directly relevant here. We therefore do not decide whether 
Article V(A) intended to freeze appropriation law as it stood in 1949, 
or whether it incorporates the evolution of the doctrine over time, 
allowing Compact-protected rights to grow or shrink accordingly. We 
resolve the first exception without prejudice to that issue.40 
For purposes of the first exception, then, the Supreme Court, like 
the Special Master before it, examined both pre- and post-1950 water law 
on the issue of improved irrigation efficiency.41 
Also problematic is the question of which state’s common law 
should govern. Although scholars can derive some common 
appropriative rights principles among the prior appropriation states,42 the 
reality is that no two states apply those principles in precisely the same 
way. Because Montana and Wyoming are the litigating parties, the 
Supreme Court began by looking at the prior appropriation laws within 
Wyoming and Montana, and from there enlarged its inquiry to the 
broader universe of western states that follow prior appropriation.43 The 
Supreme Court also noted instances when one appropriation state took a 
unique, and therefore unrepresentative, position on an issue.44 
Finally, and perhaps most problematic, is the question of how to 
craft prior appropriation law for issues on which little or no law exists. 
This task places the Supreme Court in the difficult and reluctant position 
of determining what it believes the laws of the States to be in the absence 
 40 Id. at 1771–72 n.4. 
 41 Id. 
 42 There are nine states classified as pure appropriation states and another ten considered to 
espouse a hybrid of appropriation and riparian principles. See DAVID H. GETCHES, WATER LAW IN A 
NUTSHELL 5–8 (4th ed. 2009); see also JOSEPH L. SAX ET AL., LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER 
RESOURCES: CASE AND MATERIALS 12–13 fig.1-5 (4th ed. 2006). The Court focused its inquiry 
almost exclusively on the pure appropriation states. 
 43 Montana v. Wyoming, 131 S. Ct. 1765, 1771–72 n.4 (2011). 
 44 Id. at 1775 n.8. 
9
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of case law directly on point. Such was the case with the improved 
irrigation efficiency issue, of which the Supreme Court observed that 
“[t]he lack of clarity in this area of water law highlights the sensitive 
nature of our inquiry and counsels caution.”45 To resolve this dilemma, 
the Supreme Court limited its holding to the Compact alone and stated 
that its decision “is not intended to restrict the States’ determination of 
their respective appropriation doctrines.”46 
Because there was no case on all fours, the Supreme Court looked 
to general trends in change-of-use rules and recapture rules to conclude 
that irrigation efficiency improvements “are within the original 
appropriative right of Wyoming’s pre-1950 water users,” even when 
return flows are diminished.47 Particularly compelling to the Supreme 
Court was the lack of water law scholars who have reached an alternative 
opinion on the issue.48 
As the Special Master has acknowledged, “[w]hether groundwater 
withdrawals in Wyoming can violate Article V(A) of the Compact is a 
more difficult question . . . .”49 Coalbed methane development is a 
relatively recent phenomenon that hit the Powder River Basin in the late 
1990s,50 some four decades after the Compact was entered. Coalbed 
methane groundwater pumping is on such a scale and is sufficiently 
distinct from other forms of mining water use as to require an adaptation 
in traditional water law norms. To date, the appropriation states have 
largely avoided the question of how to bring CBM development into 
compliance with state water laws, opting instead to create loopholes and 
exemptions for CBM. In response, scholars have called for legal reforms 
that better protect traditional water rights users―focusing primarily on 
CBM’s violations of the no-waste and no-injury rules in prior 
appropriation.51 The Special Master has thus begun answering the 
 45 Id. at 1773 n.5. 
 46 Id. at 1773 n.5. 
 47 Id. at 1776. 
 48 Id. at 1777. In his dissent, Justice Scalia criticizes the majority’s “none-too-confident” 
reading of the common law. Id. at 1779–80 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 49 First Interim Report, supra note 12, at 43. 
 50 ROMEO M. FLORES ET AL., U.S. DEPT. OF INTERIOR, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, OPEN-
FILE REPORT 01-126 at 2 (2001), available at pubs.usgs.gov/of/2001/ofr-01-126/OF01-126.pdf. 
 51 While the articles on point are numerous, some recent representative pieces include Colby 
Barrett, Fitting a Square Peg in a Round (Drill) Hole: The Evolving Legal Treatment of Coalbed 
Methane-Produced Water in the Intermountain West, 38 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10,661 
(2008); Gary Bryner, Coalbed Methane Development in the Intermountain West: Producing Energy 
and Protecting Water, 4 WYO. L. REV. 541 (2004); Cody Doig, Case Note, Vance v. Wolfe: 
“Beneficial Use” or “Beneficial Byproduct”?—An Analysis of Produced Water in Colorado, 13 U. 
DENV. WATER L. REV. 163 (2009); Arlene J. Kwasniak, Waste Not Want Not: A Comparative 
Analysis and Critique of Legal Rights to Use and Re-Use Produced Water—Lessons for Alberta, 10 
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difficult CBM questions by drawing on the parties’ stated intent in the 
Compact, as well as developing legal norms and scholarship in western 
water law. 
B. THE SPECIAL MASTER’S INCLUSION OF GROUNDWATER IN THE 
COMPACT 
As a threshold matter, Wyoming argued that the Compact does not 
cover groundwater, but rather is limited to the surface waters in the 
Yellowstone River Basin.52 Its argument hinged on the absence of any 
mention of groundwater in the Compact’s definitions of “Yellowstone 
River System” and “Tributary” (set out above). Under Wyoming’s 
reasoning, its water users would be allowed to pump whatever amounts 
of groundwater they wished, even if that pumping depletes surface water 
supplies in the Basin. Resolving this legal question in Montana’s favor, 
the Special Master concluded that the Compact includes groundwater 
that is hydrologically connected to surface waters in the Basin. Among 
the highlights of the Special Master’s analysis are the following: 
Evidence of the Parties’ Intent. The Special Master noted the 
Compact’s statement that pre-1950 water rights “shall continue to be 
enjoyed.” Since new groundwater withdrawals could “directly 
interfere with the continued enjoyment of pre-1950 surface rights in 
Montana,” the parties must have intended the Compact to be read 
broadly enough to cover hydrologically connected groundwaters.53 
Other important statements of intent are the Compact’s twin goals to 
“remove all causes of present and future controversy . . . with respect to 
the waters of the Yellowstone River and its tributaries” and to “provide 
for an equitable division and apportionment of such waters.”54 Quoting 
language from a Special Master’s Report in a prior compact case, the 
Special Master concluded that: 
Given the purposes of the Compact, “neither the parties to the 
Compact, nor the Congress and the President who approved it, could 
have intended that an upstream State could, with impunity, unilaterally 
enlarge its allocation by taking some of the virgin water supply before 
U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 357 (2007); Anne MacKinnon & Kate Fox, Demanding Beneficial Use: 
Opportunities and Obligations for Wyoming Regulators in Coalbed Methane, 6 WYO. L. REV. 369 
(2006). 
 52 Wyoming’s Motion to Dismiss at 59, Montana v. Wyoming, No. 137, Orig. (Apr. 1, 2008). 
 53 See First Interim Report, supra note 12, at 11, 44–45. 
 54 YELLOWSTONE RIVER COMPACT, supra note 7, pmbl., art. V(A). 
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it reached the stream flow.”55 
 
Evidence of Appropriation Law at the Time of Compact. The parties’ 
intent to include hydrologically connected groundwater is 
corroborated by the science and the state of water law at the time of 
compacting. The Special Master observed that for “decades prior” the 
appropriation doctrine recognized that groundwater directly connected 
with a stream must be jointly managed with the surface waters to 
ensure priority of water rights.56 Treatises, state court decisions, 
scientific journals, and prior compact decisions by the Supreme Court 
support this principle of connectivity.57 
 
Evidence of Appropriation Law Post-Compact. The Special Master 
also observed the post-Compact developments in groundwater law, 
noting that both Montana and Wyoming have since placed 
groundwater within their respective permitting systems, subjecting the 
waters to prior appropriation principles.58 Based on all of these 
evidentiary sources, the Special Master ultimately concluded that 
Basin groundwater diverted out of priority with hydrologically 
connected senior surface water rights would violate the Compact.59 
The Special Master reserved for future decision the issue of “exactly 
what groundwater is covered” and “the question of the exact 
circumstances under which groundwater pumping violates Article 
V(A).”60 These questions will necessarily involve discovery and 
evidentiary proceedings. Further, questions remain as to whether the 
Special Master’s conclusions on CBM groundwater use will be extended 
to include post-1950 water rights under Article V(B).61 Finally, the 
Special Master has yet to recommend the type of remedy that would 
 55 First Interim Report, supra note 12, at 53 (citing First Report of the Special Master, 
Kansas v. Nebraska, No. 126, Orig., at 21 (Jan. 28, 2000)). 
 56 See id., at 45. 
 57 See generally id. at 45–50. 
 58 Id. at 50–52. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. at 54, 90. 
 61 At this stage in the proceeding, the Special Master has reached a conclusion only as to 
claims under Article V(A). Id. at 93 (addressing Montana’s Motion for Summary Judgment on the 
question of whether the Compact applies to all tributaries of the Tongue and Powder Rivers). 
Therefore, there is a lingering question about whether the same analysis would apply to diversions 
and storage of waters affecting post-1950 water rights. On December 20, 2011, the Special Master 
held that although Montana’s Bill of Complaint is broad enough to cover post-1950 claims, it must 
seek leave to amend its Complaint to more clearly articulate those claims under the Compact. See 
generally Memorandum Opinion of the Special Master on Montana’s Claims Under Article V(B), 
Montana v. Wyoming, 131 S. Ct. 1765 (2011) (No. 137, Orig.) [hereinafter Opinion on Article V(B) 
Claims]. 
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redress injuries and prospectively ensure that CBM groundwater 
withdrawals do not take waters belonging to water users under the 
Compact. 
Viewing the Supreme Court’s ruling and the Special Master’s 
conclusions together, a framework emerges for how to resolve the 
remaining CBM issues in the case. As argued in Part III, the Special 
Master should include post-1950 water rights in his recommendations to 
ensure a complete resolution of the CBM controversy between the States. 
The Special Master should also note where Wyoming’s CBM regulations 
fail to follow prior appropriation principles and jeopardize the continued 
enjoyment of water rights protected by the Compact. Noting the 
deficiencies in Montana’s CBM regulations is important as well because 
Montana water users should be equally protected from CBM 
groundwater depletions on the Montana side of the Basin.62 Finally, the 
Special Master should require a science-informed analysis of injury to 
water users, along with ongoing monitoring and management, as part of 
the CBM well permitting process in both States. 
These recommended steps are important for several reasons. 
Foremost, leaving these issues unresolved will lead to the inevitable 
return of the parties to the U.S. Supreme Court for further lengthy 
proceedings. Coalbed methane development is occurring at a 
breathtaking pace and there is no evidence that the States, on their own, 
will legislatively address the deficiencies in their CBM regulations. Nor 
do the parties’ recent breakdowns in negotiations provide assurance of a 
compromised settlement. Additionally, because of the sheer magnitude 
of groundwater pumping involved, time is of the essence. The longer the 
States turn a blind eye to the harms caused by CBM development, the 
greater the risk that water users will be injured and that irreversible 
depletions will occur to the Basin’s water resources. Finally, by 
addressing how CBM groundwater production fits within the prior 
appropriation systems of Montana and Wyoming, the Special Master and 
the parties are in the unique position of creating a successful process that 
other western states can emulate. At present, the law is in a state of 
transition in the appropriation states and there is often dissension among 
the legislative, agency, and judicial forces brought to bear on the 
question. Thus, the interstate conflict between Montana and Wyoming 
presents a unique opportunity to reform a broken system, and this 
opportunity should be seized. 
 62 If Montana were held to a different standard than Wyoming, it would also open the door 
for Wyoming to argue that depletions on the Montana side of the Basin may be due in part to 
Montana-permitted CBM wells. 
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III. SEIZING A RARE OPPORTUNITY BEFORE IT IS TOO LATE 
Rarely does a water law question that is confounding several states 
land squarely before the U.S. Supreme Court in the context of an 
interstate waters dispute. While it is admittedly not the Supreme Court’s 
responsibility to solve the legal paradoxes of state water law, the western 
states may nonetheless be secondary beneficiaries of the conclusions and 
solutions that emerge from the Montana v. Wyoming CBM dispute. 
Further, there are several major CBM basins that straddle state lines in 
the West, suggesting the likelihood of future interstate waters disputes 
that raise similar issues to those in Montana v. Wyoming.63 Because of 
the unique role of the Special Master,64 the western states can benefit 
from both an expert synthesis of this water law issue and an expert 
recommendation on how to resolve the issue through regulatory and 
management regimes. At the very least, these states should pay careful 
attention not only to the Special Master’s rulings on the question, but 
also to the on-the-ground successes and failures that will ensue as 
Wyoming and Montana attempt to comply with those rulings. 
Thus, although it is customary for courts to address legal questions 
on their narrowest grounds, a broader approach is warranted in the case 
of Montana v. Wyoming. For example, while a decisionmaker may be 
inclined to resolve the more limited question of how CBM development 
may harm pre-1950 water rights, the hydrogeologic reality suggests that 
post-1950 water rights would also be impacted and should therefore be 
considered as part of a single water resource. Further, a decisionmaker 
may be inclined to simply rule that Wyoming cease withdrawing 
groundwater in violation of the Compact, leaving it to the States to work 
out the specifics of that ruling. But the stalemate between Montana and 
Wyoming, combined with a general recalcitrance among the western 
 63 See COALBED METHANE PRODUCED WATER, supra note 1, at 20 fig.2.1 (depicting several 
major coalbed methane basins that straddle state lines in Montana, Wyoming, Utah, Colorado, and 
New Mexico); see also CBM PRIMER, supra note 1, at 7–8 figs.5, 6. 
 64 Carstens makes the following observations about the Special Master process: 
The appointment of a Special Master may be initiated either on motion, which the Court may 
refuse to grant, or at the Court's own prerogative. After appointing a Special Master, the 
Court provides little supervision of the master's proceedings. Even as a preliminary matter, 
no rule governing Supreme Court practice expressly provides for the appointment of Special 
Masters, as contrasted with the appointment mechanism for special masters in the lower 
federal courts set forth in Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. . . . 
 
Practice and time have shown that the Court generally adopts the Special Masters' reports, 
even when those reports make conclusions of law in addition to resolving issues of fact. 
Carstens, supra note 11, at 653, 655–56 (footnote omitted). 
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states to regulate CBM development, suggests that a more directed and 
guided court remedy is warranted—a remedy that requires 
comprehensively managing connected surface and groundwaters in the 
Basin.65 
Absent a broader resolution of the CBM issue, it is highly likely that 
the litigants will return to the Supreme Court to seek resolution of these 
questions in the future. Additionally, private parties affected by CBM 
development may commence federal litigation against the States and the 
Compact Commission for failing to fully perform the terms of the 
Compact.66 In other words, it is a wise use of judicial resources to 
address these questions while the litigation is before the Supreme Court. 
Aside from the likelihood of additional litigation, there is an even 
greater hydrological risk that comes with allowing further time to lapse 
before CBM groundwater withdrawals are comprehensively addressed. 
As John Leshy noted in his seminal work on interstate groundwater 
resources: 
[S]ome aquifers are “recharged,” or replenished, very slowly or not at 
all, and artificial recharge may not be possible. Pumping water from 
these aquifers may amount to mining a non-renewable resource . . . . 
[M]uch groundwater is connected hydrologically to surface waters; in 
fact, the U.S. Geological Survey now estimates that groundwater is the 
source of almost 40 percent of the streamflow in the entire country. As 
groundwater extraction increases, surface streams may dwindle or 
disappear, and rights to use water from those streams may go 
unsatisfied, even though typically they were established first. . . . 
 
Confined to pore spaces in geological beds, groundwater tends to 
move much more slowly than surface water. As a result, the impact of 
withdrawals from a well . . . on the flows of watercourses on the 
surface[] may not be perceived for months, years, or even decades. . . . 
 
[T]he more we learn about groundwater, the more we learn it is 
connected to surface watercourses, which themselves often cross state 
lines. . . . Moreover, it seems the more we learn about the subsurface, 
 65 To the extent that the States show a fresh interest in negotiating a settlement regarding 
CBM water use, the Court’s guidance is equally helpful in that situation. 
 66 YELLOWSTONE RIVER COMPACT, supra note 7, art. III. This article creates the 
Commission and charges it with “carry[ing] out the provisions of this Compact.” This article also 
authorizes the Commission to be sued in its official capacity. For an example of a private action 
under the Compact, see Intake Water Co. v. Yellowstone River Compact Comm'n, 590 F. Supp. 293, 
294 (D. Mont. 1983) (recognizing federal subject matter jurisdiction over a private water 
development company’s suit to challenge Article X of the Compact relating to restrictions on out-of-
basin transfers). 
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the more likely we may find that seemingly isolated local aquifers 
connect to other aquifers that have connections across state lines 
through groundwater or surface water. . . . 
 
Where groundwater extraction (in general, and perhaps especially 
where interstate groundwater extraction) is involved, if it turns out the 
impact is significant, by the time this fact becomes known, mitigating 
it may be difficult, if not impossible.67 
 These words apply directly to the Yellowstone River Basin, in 
which the U.S. Geological Survey has documented vast underground 
aquifers that extend beneath both Wyoming and Montana.68 A significant 
portion of these aquifers is part of the greater Northern Great Plains 
aquifer system. The groundwater in these aquifers, as the surface waters 
above, flows in a north and northeasterly direction from Wyoming into 
Montana, where much of the water is used for domestic and irrigation 
supply.69 Further, the studies reflect a high level of groundwater and 
surface water connectivity, with surface waters influencing aquifer 
formations and groundwater discharging to surface waters in places 
throughout the Yellowstone River Basin. The studies also reflect 
complex and yet-to-be-understood relationships among the various 
aquifers, which are both confined and unconfined, and found at various 
depths below the ground surface. The risks of diminished water supply 
and dewatering are imminent and real.70 
 This data only scratches the surface of information that might be 
developed for the Powder River Basin. But one thing is clear: CBM 
resources crisscross the very same strata in which this complex system of 
groundwater aquifers resides, and CBM groundwater pumping is 
occurring at an unprecedented rate.71 Coalbed methane wells in the Basin 
 67 John D. Leshy, Interstate Groundwater Resources: The Federal Role, 14 HASTINGS W.-
NW. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 1475, 1477, 1479, 1481, 1497 (2008) (footnote omitted); see also 
Lawrence J. MacDonnell, Integrating Use of Ground and Surface Water in Wyoming, 47 IDAHO L. 
REV. 51, 62 (2010) (“It is widely acknowledged that, sooner or later, most ground water uses will 
reduce water available in surface water sources. It is really only a matter of when and how much.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
 68 See RONALD B. ZELT ET AL., U.S. DEPT. OF INTERIOR, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, 
ENVIRONMENTAL SETTING OF THE YELLOWSTONE RIVER BASIN, MONTANA, NORTH DAKOTA, AND 
WYOMING 52–55 & fig.16 (1999), available at pubs.usgs.gov/wri/wri984269/wri984269.pdf. 
 69 See R. L. WHITEHEAD, U.S. DEPT. OF INTERIOR, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, GROUND 
WATER ATLAS OF THE UNITED STATES: MONTANA, NORTH DAKOTA, SOUTH DAKOTA, WYOMING, 
The Northern Great Plains Aquifer System & fig.50 (1996), available at 
pubs.usgs.gov/ha/ha730/ch_i/I-text2.html. 
 70 See CBM PRIMER, supra note 1, at 14. 
 71 See ZELT ET AL., supra note 68, at 21–22 (identifying strata later discussed as housing 
aquifer systems). 
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pump at a higher daily volume than any other major CBM basin.72 An 
animated map produced by the Wyoming State Geological Survey 
(WSGS) shows that by 2007 CBM water production had reached 2.5 
billion gallons per month on the Wyoming side of the Basin73—a figure 
that may be conservative based on other estimates of nine billion gallons 
per month.74 Even under more conservative figures, one month of CBM 
groundwater pumping consumes a water quantity that would serve the 
entire City of Sheridan, Wyoming, for over three years.75 Further, 
Wyoming estimates that the CBM industry has the capacity to install 
wells at the rate of 100 per week, with approximately 30,000 wells 
forecasted to be running today and 50,000-100,000 wells at full build-
out.76 The Wyoming Coal Bed Natural Gas Water Management Task 
Force estimates that from 2006 to 2029, cumulative CBM water 
production in the Basin will reach 11.6 billion barrels (or 487.2 billion 
gallons).77 
 Wyoming’s CBM literature acknowledges a lack of understanding 
about aquifer recharge and the reality that “it may take hundreds of years 
to fully recharge” the withdrawn waters.78 The U.S. Department of 
Interior similarly estimates aquifer drawdowns of several hundred feet in 
some areas of the Basin, with a full aquifer recovery that would extend 
“over the next hundred years”79 —“not happening within the lifetimes of 
any of the state’s residents.”80 By that time the CBM well, which has a 
seven-to-ten-year life span, will have long been abandoned and the 
 72 See CBM PRIMER, supra note 1, at 14 tbl.2. 
 73 Wyoming State Geological Survey, Powder River Basin Animation, 
www.wsgs.uwyo.edu/GIS_and_online_maps/Animations/PRB.aspx (last visited Mar. 12, 2012). The 
animation presents the unit of measurement as a BBL or barrel. One barrel equals approximately 
forty-two gallons of water. COALBED METHANE PRODUCED WATER, supra note 1, at 36 n.5. 
 74 See supra note 6 (discussing range of figures available in the CBM literature). 
 75 POWDER/TONGUE RIVER BASIN WATER PLAN TECHNICAL MEMORANDA, HKM 
Engineering, Inc. (Feb. 2002), available at waterplan.state.wy.us/plan/powder/techmemos/ 
muniuse.html (noting Sheridan’s annual use of 689.72 million gallons of water). 
 76 See RODNEY H. De BRUIN ET AL., WYOMING STATE GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, COALBED 
METHANE IN WYOMING, INFORMATION PAMPHLET 7, at 20 (2d ed. 2004), available at 
www.wsgs.uwyo.edu/docs/coalbed.pdf; CBM PRIMER, supra note 1, at 11 & fig.8. 
 77 WYOMING COAL BED NATURAL GAS WATER MANAGEMENT TASK FORCE INTERIM 
REPORT 6 (Dec. 14, 2006) (on file with author). 
 78 See DE BRUIN ET AL., supra note 76, at 19–20. 
 79 See BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR, WYOMING POWDER RIVER BASIN 
FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT xxxi, 4–38 (Jan. 2003), available at 
www.blm.gov/pgdata/etc/medialib/blm/wy/information/NEPA/prb-feis/vol_1.Par.67414.File.dat/ 
front3.pdf. 
 80 BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR, MONTANA STATEWIDE DRAFT OIL 
AND GAS ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT 4–37 (Jan. 2002), available at 
bogc.dnrc.mt.gov/webmapper_cbm_info_res.asp. 
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producer will have moved on.81 
 Another sobering reality is that we cannot find solace in either 
Montana’s or Wyoming’s water permitting systems. Both States, like 
other appropriative rights states dealing with CBM development, are 
widely criticized for their handling of CBM.82 Most notably, both States 
allow pumping without preliminary inquiry into the harm to existing 
water rights holders.83 Both also allow the massive wasting of pumped 
groundwater via discharges or storage in evaporation holding ponds.84 
And while Montana law does provide for some compensation to injured 
well owners, surface water owners are not compensated, and the burden 
of proof is on the injured water user to prove causation85—no small task 
in light of the hydrogeologic complexities discussed above. In this 
regard, Montana’s allegations against Wyoming’s CBM development 
ring slightly disingenuous because Montana is perpetrating similar harms 
against its own water rights holders. This of course does not excuse 
Wyoming’s violations of the Compact. Nor should it alter the outcome of 
the case. But it does suggest that reforms on Montana’s part are also 
necessary. Indeed, careful management on the Montana side will be 
important to ensure that its water users receive the Compact benefits that 
Montana negotiated for them back in 1950. 
 In the not-so-distant past, states handled groundwater 
 81 See CBM PRIMER, supra note 1, at 7. 
 82 See generally Barrett, supra note 51; see Robert E. Beck, Current Water Issues in Oil and 
Gas Development and Production: Will Water Control What Energy We Have?, 49 WASHBURN L.J. 
423 (2010); see also Samantha Bohrman, Groundwater Conservation and Coalbed Methane 
Development in the Powder River Basin, 24 LAW & INEQ. 181 (2006); Bryner, supra note 51; 
MacKinnon & Fox, supra note 51; James Murphy, Slowing the Onslaught and Forecasting Hope for 
Change: Litigation Efforts Concerning the Environmental Impacts of Coalbed Methane 
Development in the Powder River Basin, 24 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 399 (2007); Neal Joseph Valorz, 
Comment, The Need for Codification of Wyoming’s Coal Bed Methane Produced Groundwater 
Laws, 10 WYO. L. REV. 115 (2010). 
 83 See MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-510 (Westlaw 2011) (placing CBM permitting under the 
jurisdiction of the Montana Board of Oil & Gas and outside of the water rights permitting process 
that examines injury under Mont. Code Ann. § 85-2-311); see also WYO. STAT. ANN. § 41-3-931 
(Westlaw 2011), generally requiring that applications “be granted as a matter of course.” Wyoming 
scholars note that the state engineer does not as a matter of practice evaluate harm to existing water 
users before permitting a new groundwater well. See MacDonnell, supra note 67, at 53 n.20; see also 
Lawrence J. Wolfe & Jennifer G. Hager, Wyoming’s Groundwater Laws: Quantity and Quality 
Regulation, 24 LAND & WATER L. REV. 39, 48, 62–64 (1989) (describing a process whereby senior 
appropriators object to interference by junior users after the juniors have obtained a permit). 
 84 See MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-505(1) (Westlaw 2011) (prohibiting waste of groundwater 
but specifically exempting the “management, discharge, or reinjection of ground water produced in 
association with a coalbed methane well” from the definition of waste); see also Revised Interim 
Policy Memo from Patrick T. Tyrrell, State Engineer, to Wyoming State Engineer’s Office at 4–5 
(Apr. 26, 2004) (allowing produced groundwater to be disposed of via evaporation, infiltration, or 
discharge into reservoirs or leach fields) (on file with author). 
 85 See MONT. CODE ANN. § 82-11-175 (Westlaw 2011). 
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complexities by simply ignoring groundwater issues until they reached 
crisis proportions.86 We can no longer afford that approach. If a 
comprehensive, proactive remedy is not prescribed in the Montana v. 
Wyoming litigation, the odds of significant, perhaps irreversible, damage 
appear high. While the task of fashioning that remedy is daunting, it will 
be exponentially harder if we wait until some distant date in the future to 
unravel the consequences of the CBM development that is spreading 
rapidly across the face of the Powder River Basin landscape. 
IV. MOVING TOWARDS A MEANINGFUL REMEDY FOR WATER RIGHTS 
USERS 
In its Complaint, Montana requests that Wyoming pay monetary 
damages for the wrongful water depletions it has caused. Montana also 
asks the U.S. Supreme Court to prospectively “command[] the State of 
Wyoming in the future to deliver the waters of the Tongue and Powder 
Rivers in accordance with the provisions of the Yellowstone River 
Compact” and to grant such “other relief as the Court deems just and 
proper.”87 The Supreme Court may provide such prospective remedies to 
avoid further breaches of the Compact.88 
At this juncture, it is important to note that the Special Master has 
yet to hear evidence and make findings about the extent to which CBM 
groundwater withdrawals are connected to and depleting surface waters 
covered by the Compact.89 In that sense the logical leap to remedies may 
appear premature. There are two important reasons why it is not. First, 
the existing, albeit incomplete, geohydrologic studies of the Basin 
indicate a high likelihood of connectivity and injury throughout the 
Basin.90 To the extent that any particular CBM well is shown to be 
unconnected to surface waters, that is no guarantee that other, future 
wells will also be unconnected. There is thus an ongoing risk of future 
injury that can only be addressed through prospective Compact remedies. 
Second, the magnitude of the risk, and its potentially irreversible and 
long-term nature,91 warrant an abundance of caution―essentially the 
exercise of a precautionary remedy―until the States have more fully and 
 86 Leshy, supra note 67, at 1492 (discussing how the complication and cost of groundwater 
management is a major reason that state governments “have put off grappling with the challenge 
until a true crisis looms”). 
 87 Bill of Complaint, supra note 7, at 5. 
 88 See Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. 554, 568 (1983). 
 89 See supra note 14 and related discussion. 
 90 See discussion supra Parts II and III.B. 
 91 See discussion supra Parts II and III.B. 
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accurately studied the impacts of CBM production on the Basin’s surface 
water supply.92 
As the Special Master determines the appropriate remedies in 
Montana v. Wyoming, there are three principal steps he can take to set 
Montana and Wyoming CBM development on a better course toward 
Compact compliance. First, the Special Master should extend his 
groundwater ruling to post-1950 water rights so that those rights are also 
protected from CBM groundwater withdrawals. Only by addressing the 
full spectrum of Compact water rights will the States be in a position to 
cohesively regulate CBM groundwater pumping in the Basin. Second, 
because the Compact expressly adopts the principles of prior 
appropriation, the Special Master should identify the ways in which the 
States’ existing CBM regulations violate those principles. Third, the 
Special Master should require that groundwater modeling, data 
collection, and reporting occur in the Basin to ensure through sound 
science that CBM development is not injuring Compact water rights. 
Ultimately, these steps may also help guide the greater community of 
prior appropriation states grappling with CBM groundwater use. 
A. AN ADEQUATE REMEDY REQUIRES THAT THE SPECIAL MASTER’S 
CONCLUSION ABOUT GROUNDWATER BE EXTENDED TO POST-1950 
RIGHTS UNDER THE COMPACT 
The Special Master has already concluded that Wyoming CBM 
groundwater pumping violates the Compact if it depletes surface waters 
allocated to Montana’s pre-1950 water rights users.93 Montana’s 
Complaint broadly asserts that Wyoming’s CBM groundwater 
withdrawals constitute a “violation of Montana’s rights under Article V 
of the Compact,” which covers post-1950 rights as well.94 Although the 
Special Master originally reserved all questions about post-1950 water 
rights,95 he subsequently held that Montana must seek leave to amend its 
Complaint to more particularly describe its post-1950 claims.96 This 
leave should be granted so that the Special Master and the U.S. Supreme 
Court can holistically address the impact of CBM groundwater 
production on Compact water rights. Indeed, the question is important 
enough that the parties should stipulate to allowing the Special Master to 
consider all Compact water rights when fashioning a remedy relating to 
 92 Such a precautionary approach is described further in Part III.C, infra. 
 93 See First Interim Report, supra note 12, at 89-90. 
 94 See discussion supra Part I.A; Bill of Complaint, supra note 7, ¶ 11. 
 95 First Interim Report, supra note 12, at 93. 
 96 See generally Opinion on Article V(B) Claims, supra note 61. 
20
Golden Gate University Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 5, Iss. 2 [2012], Art. 6
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/gguelj/vol5/iss2/6
  
2012] COALBED METHANE DEVELOPMENT 317 
n the case.99 
 
CBM groundwater withdrawals. Ignoring post-1950 water rights would 
invite future litigation and unnecessarily complicate the regulation of 
surface and groundwater withdrawals in the Basin. 
Although the year 1950 marks an important temporal line for 
purposes of distinguishing Compact water rights, that temporal 
significance fades in the face of the hydrogeologic realities of the Basin. 
Both pre- and post-1950 water rights draw upon the same surface water 
supply, and both are equally vulnerable to depletion from CBM 
groundwater withdrawals. Coalbed methane groundwater pumping could 
deplete surface waters that would otherwise pass across the hydrologic 
“point of measurement” and be equitably divided between the States as 
part of the Compact’s post-1950 waters rights allocation.97 This 
depletion would amount to a skimming off the “bottom” before the 
Compact’s water accounting takes place. Further, to the extent that 
Wyoming is curtailing delivery of Montana’s pre-1950 water rights, 
those senior users on the Montana side may in turn be dipping into the 
waters otherwise available to Montana’s junior, post-1950 users. As the 
Special Master has already concluded, the science and law of water, 
including prior Supreme Court compact decisions, have evolved to treat 
connected waters as a jointly managed resource.98 Thus, an integrated 
analysis of CBM impacts to all Compact water rights is critical to 
achieving an adequate remedy i
The Compact sends strong signals that post-1950 water rights are 
protected by the same prior appropriation principles that the Supreme 
Court and Special Master applied to pre-1950 water rights: 
Of the unused and unappropriated waters of the interstate tributaries of 
the Yellowstone River as of January 1, 1950, there is allocated to each 
signatory state such quantity of that water as shall be necessary to 
provide supplemental water supplies for the [pre-1950 appropriative] 
rights described in paragraph A of this Article V, such supplemental 
rights to be acquired and enjoyed in accordance with the laws 
governing the acquisition and use of water under the doctrine of 
appropriation, and the remainder of the unused and unappropriated 
water is allocated to each state for storage or direct diversions for 
 97 See discussion supra Part I.A (discussing allocation of post-1950 waters); YELLOWSTONE 
RIVER COMPACT, supra note 7, art. V(B) (noting the points of measurement on the Tongue and 
Powder Rivers). 
 98 See supra notes 56 and 57, and related discussion. 
 99 The Special Master has concluded that the post-1950 rights must yield to the pre-1950 
rights in the way that junior users must yield to senior users under the appropriative system. See First 
Interim Report, supra note 12, at 89. 
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beneficial use on new lands or for other purposes as follows . . . .100 
Article V(B) contemplates two categories of post-1950 water rights: 
(1) water rights that can be used to supplement pre-1950 water rights on 
existing irrigated lands; and (2) new water rights for storage, direct 
diversions, or other purposes on new lands, based on a percentage 
allocation. With respect to the first category, Article V(B) mentions the 
doctrine of appropriation and highlights the high priority the States 
placed on irrigation purposes. With respect to the second category, 
Article V(B) recites the classic appropriative requirement of beneficial 
use. Nothing in this provision suggests that the pumping of high volumes 
of hydrologically connected groundwater, which could injure surface 
water rights users, would be acceptable to the signatory States. 
The parties’ actions at the time of compacting further corroborate 
that post-1950 water uses are subject to and protected by prior 
appropriation principles. When Montana codified the Compact and 
related implementing statutes in 1953, it specifically provided that: 
All appropriative rights to the beneficial uses of the waters of the 
interstate tributaries of the Yellowstone River acquired after January 
1, 1950, are subject to distribution in the states of Montana and 
Wyoming . . . as provided in subsections [B] and [C] of Article V of 
said compact. The purpose of this part is to provide the means to 
determine the various appropriative rights to the beneficial uses of 
water of the interstate tributaries of the Yellowstone River acquired 
after January 1, 1950, and the quantity of water diverted and used by 
each such appropriator during each year, to enable the state of 
Montana and the Yellowstone River Compact [C]ommission to 
comply with and to administer the percentage allocations as provided 
in subsections [B] and [C] of Article V of said compact.101 
Wyoming adopted a similar statutory expectation, providing that 
“[t]he state engineer may issue his approval of an application proposing 
to divert compact water allocated to Wyoming if (i) [t]he diversion and 
the ultimate use of the water are for a beneficial use of water; and (ii) 
[t]he diversion and ultimate use of water will not adversely affect the 
water rights of other persons . . . .”102 And as the Special Master has 
recognized, both States long ago extended their prior appropriation laws 
 100 YELLOWSTONE RIVER COMPACT, supra note 7, art. V(B) (emphasis added). 
 101 MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-20-102 (Westlaw 2011) (enacted 1953) (emphasis added). 
 102 WYO. STAT. ANN. § 41-12-607(b)(i),(ii) (Westlaw 2011) (enacted 1957) (emphasis added); 
see id. § 41-12-605(a)(i),(ii) (using nearly identical language in describing required contents of 
application for approval). 
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to groundwater,103 lending further credence to the conclusion that the 
Compact’s appropriation principles must govern and limit CBM 
groundwater withdrawals. 
Further relevant are the Compact’s exceptions for single-household 
domestic uses and stockwater reservoirs not exceeding 20 acre-feet in 
capacity.104 These narrow categories are the only uses that the States 
agreed could occur outside of the Compact’s division of waters under 
Article V(B). Such de minimis uses are strikingly different from CBM 
development, which pumps billions of gallons of water annually. 
Likewise, the Compact’s repeated emphasis on “the great 
importance of water for irrigation” and the Commission’s authority to 
recommend water reallocations for irrigable lands signals an overriding 
intent to safeguard this type of beneficial use.105 Although the 
legislatures of Wyoming and Montana have subsequently adopted public 
policies to promote CBM development,106 those state-level policies 
cannot trump the multilateral, congressionally codified policies of the 
Compact.107 The parties in 1950 signaled a clear intent that future uses of 
Basin waters would be beneficially applied and not pumped out of 
priority and then wasted to the detriment of irrigators, livestock 
producers, and others seeking to eke out a living in the arid lands of the 
Basin. The Special Master’s observations about pre-1950 water rights are 
thus equally apropos for post-1950 water rights: 
Given the purposes of the Compact, “neither the parties to the 
Compact, nor the Congress and the President who approved it, could 
have intended that an upstream State could, with impunity, unilaterally 
enlarge its allocation by taking some of the virgin water supply before 
it reached the stream flow.”108 
Finally, the parties stated that they intended an “equitable division 
 103 See supra notes 58 and 59, and related discussion. 
 104 See YELLOWSTONE RIVER COMPACT, supra note 7, arts. V(E)(1), II(I). 
               105 Id. pmbl. & art. V(F). As noted, Article V(B) also creates a hierarchy that places 
supplemental irrigation rights first. 
 106 The Montana Legislature has even gone so far as to classify CBM development as a 
“compelling state interest.” MONT. CODE ANN. § 82-11-173 (Westlaw 2011). 
 107 Interestingly, there is an additional question as to whether Montana’s current CBM 
regulations contravene the Montana Constitution’s requirement that “[t]he legislature shall . . . enact 
laws and provide appropriations to protect, enhance, and develop all agriculture.” MONT. CONST. art. 
XII, § 1(1). Or the Montana Constitution’s requirement that state waters be treated as a public trust 
and allocated according to prior appropriation principles. MONT. CONST. art. IX, § 3. 
 108 First Interim Report, supra note 12, at 53 (citing First Report of the Special Master, 
Kansas v. Nebraska, No. 126, Orig., at 21 (Jan. 28, 2000)). 
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and apportionment” of the Basin’s waters.109 Although equitable 
apportionment is a doctrine that typically applies to interstate water 
disputes in the absence of a compact, in this case the parties expressly 
incorporated similar principles into the Compact.110 They first stated that 
they intended the division of waters to be “equitable,”111 and later went 
so far as to give the Compact Commission the powers to recommend 
modifications to the percentage allocations for post-1950 waters to 
ensure the divisions are “fair, just, and equitable.”112 Thus, the parties 
intended to follow notions of equity and fairness that echo the principles 
of the equitable apportionment doctrine. 
The Supreme Court describes the equitable apportionment doctrine 
as seeking a “just and equitable” allocation of water under which a 
“delicate adjustment of interests . . . must be made.”113 It has noted in 
prior interstate water disputes that states “have an affirmative duty under 
the doctrine of equitable apportionment to take reasonable steps to 
conserve and even to augment the natural resources within their borders 
for the benefit of other States.”114 Because the parties entering into the 
Compact used remarkably similar wording to that of the Supreme Court, 
the evidence suggests that they too were seeking to delicately balance the 
interests of the States. Some three decades after the parties agreed to this 
equity, the States have introduced a new use that throws the system out 
of balance. It is impossible to conceive of a way that the Compact can 
fairly divide post-1950 waters without factoring in the millions of gallons 
of groundwater pumped each day that are likely contributing to the loss 
of surface waters in the Basin.115 The parties’ inability to right the 
balance on their own leaves the matter best resolved by the U.S. Supreme 
Court, working through its Special Master. 
It is important to view these various statements of the parties’ intent 
 109 See YELLOWSTONE RIVER COMPACT, supra note 7, pmbl. 
 110 Equitable apportionment is a doctrine that has evolved through Supreme Court 
jurisprudence involving interstate water disputes. Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176, 183 
(1982). Under this doctrine the Court considers a variety of factors, including: “physical and climatic 
conditions, the consumptive use of water in the several sections of the river, the character and rate of 
return flows, the extent of established uses, the availability of storage water, the practical effect of 
wasteful uses on downstream areas, [and] the damage to upstream areas as compared to the benefits 
to downstream areas if a limitation is imposed on the former.” Id. (quoting Nebraska v. Wyoming, 
325 U.S. 589, 618 (1945)). 
 111 YELLOWSTONE RIVER COMPACT, supra note 7, pmbl. 
 112 Id. art. V(F). 
 113 See Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. at 183. 
 114 Idaho v. Oregon, 462 U.S. 1017, 1025 (1983) (discussing salmon). 
 115 CBM PRIMER, supra note 1, at 15 (estimating that the average flow from a CBM well in 
the Powder River Basin is 12–15 gallons/minute, which roughly translates to 17,000–21,000 gallons 
per day per well). 
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as a whole and give them each effect. In a prior case involving the 
Yellowstone River Compact during the late 1970s and early 1980s, a 
federal district court first had the opportunity to interpret the Compact. 
The case, Utah International Inc. v. Intake Water Co.,116 involved 
private water suppliers seeking to develop water storage, and it provided 
some important guidance on compact construc
To begin with, each article of the Compact is presumptively consistent 
with the body of the Compact as a whole, and is entitled to its 
presumptive validity and consistency until it is otherwise clearly 
shown. Beyond that basic tenet of statutory construction, it is further 
to be presumed that each article of the Compact was crafted by its 
drafters to serve a specific purpose; it is the obligation of this Court to 
give effect to that purpose.117 
The Compact provisions described above, when viewed as a whole, 
demonstrate that Wyoming and Montana intended that post-1950 water 
uses follow the principles of prior appropriation and that a highly 
consumptive use such as CBM would have to be properly accounted for 
under those principles. Thus, the very same analysis that the Special 
Master applied to pre-1950 water rights holds true for the post-1950 
Compact provisions. To give effect to these Compact provisions and 
ensure they serve their specific purposes, the Montana v. Wyoming 
litigation must address CBM’s impacts on the full spectrum of water 
rights protected under Article V. Such an approach not only serves the 
purposes of the Compact, but better positions the parties to address the 
hydrogeologic complexities of CBM water use in an integrated manner. 
By including all Compact water rights in the litigation, the Special 
Master can then take the next step of identifying the areas where current  
 
Wyoming and Montana CBM regulations fail to protect Compact water 
 116 Utah Int’l Inc. v. Intake Water Co. 484 F. Supp. 36 (D. Mont. 1979). The dispute in Utah 
Int’l Inc. involved two private companies fighting over which had the more senior priority date to 
develop water. Id. at 39. One company argued that it did not have to submit to Montana’s 
appropriative rules and permitting requirements in developing water on the Wyoming side of the 
Yellowstone River Basin. The other argued that the first company would be using post-1950 waters 
allocated to Montana under the Compact and therefore was subject to Montana rules. While the 
district court declined to consider several issues that were already pending before a Montana state 
court, it did set forth the above guiding principle in determining that both states exercised shared 
jurisdiction over the water permit applications. Id. at 44–45. Five years later, one of the litigants 
would go back to court to litigate a separate issue under the Compact. In that case, the Ninth Circuit 
observed in passing that “[t]he Yellowstone River Compact fixes the water usage of all waters of the 
Yellowstone River Basin.” Intake Water Co. v. Yellowstone River Compact Comm'n, 769 F.2d 568, 
569 (9th Cir. 1985) (emphasis added). 
 117 Utah Int’l Inc., at 44–45. 
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rights. 
B. AN ADEQUATE REMEDY REQUIRES IDENTIFYING HOW THE STATES’ 
CURRENT CBM REGULATIONS VIOLATE PRINCIPLES OF PRIOR 
APPROPRIATION 
The path of CBM regulation in the West has been one marked by 
legislative accommodation of CBM development.118 By and large, the 
CBM industry permitting process operates outside of the prior 
appropriation system. To the extent states subject CBM to water rights 
permitting review, it is a superficial form of review that fails to 
meaningfully analyze injury to existing water users. Wyoming and 
Montana are no exception, which becomes problematic when the 
Compact provides that the waters within the Basin must be used in 
accordance with appropriative principles. Using the Supreme Court’s 
Opinion on Exception to Report of Special Master (discussed in Part I) as 
guidance, the Special Master can look to the appropriative laws both 
prior to and following the parties’ entry into the Compact, along with 
prevailing legal scholarship,119 to identify where CBM regulations fall 
short. This step is integral to the parties’ remedy because, absent specific 
directives from the Supreme Court, the legislatures of both States are 
unlikely to enact the regulatory reforms necessary for Compact 
compliance. 
The States’ regulatory approach to CBM production runs afoul of 
several traditional concepts of prior appropriation. First, CBM 
groundwater pumping creates a level of waste that the West has never 
 118 Legislatures, in fact, often undo judicial decisions requiring a deeper review of CBM 
groundwater withdrawals. As one example, the Montana Legislature disagreed with a judicial 
decision holding that CBM groundwater withdrawals must be reviewed for injury to senior 
appropriators from the initial point of withdrawal. The MDNRC had been reviewing the question of 
injury only if, after withdrawal, the CBM developer wanted to apply the produced water to another 
use. The MDNRC created a legal fiction that required review of the application as one for surface 
water use whose source was the pipeline into which the water had been pumped. See infra note 156 
and related text for a discussion of the case and regulatory background. The Montana Legislature 
passed HB 575, which was intended to supersede the court’s holding. Montana Legislature, Detailed 
Bill Information 2009, H.B. 575, laws.leg.mt.gov/laws09/LAW0203W$BSRV.ActionQuery? 
P_BLTP_BILL_TYP_CD=HB&P_BILL_NO=575&P_BILL_DFT_NO=&P_CHPT_NO=&Z_ACT
ION=Find&P_SBJ_DESCR=&P_SBJT_SBJ_CD=&P_LST_NM1=&P_ENTY_ID_SEQ= (last 
visited Mar. 12, 2012). The Governor ultimately vetoed the legislation because it “reverses 
longstanding principles of Western and Montana water law by allowing the issuance of a permit for 
the use of water associated with coal be methane (“CBM”) production without providing protection 
to senior water rights holders.” Letter from Brian Schweitzer, Governor of Montana, to Linda 
McCulloch, Secretary of State (Apr. 29, 2009), available at data.opi.mt.gov/bills/2009/ 
AmdHtmH/hb0575govveto.HTM. 
 119 See generally supra notes 51 and 83 (citing recent and prominent scholarship on CBM). 
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known or tolerated in water law. Even under new legislative 
machinations to categorize CBM groundwater withdrawals as a 
“beneficial use,” there is no analysis of whether the CBM wells are 
operating at an efficiency level traditionally required under a water rights 
permit. There is also an unresolved question of whether CBM by-product 
water is beneficially used when it reaches the surface. The predominant 
model is to either discharge the water across the land or store it in 
evaporation ponds,120 neither of which involves beneficial use. Second, 
the States are avoiding the fundamental, threshold inquiry asked of all 
new water users: “Will your proposed use injure existing water rights?” 
Instead of answering this question, CBM operators advance on a 
permitting fast track that bypasses all injury analysis. In keeping with the 
body of legal scholarship calling for reform, the Special Master should 
thus focus on the ways that CBM production is permitted to violate the 
no-waste and no-injury rules of prior appropriation. 
i. CBM Groundwater Pumping Violates the No-Waste Rule of Prior 
Appropriation 
The Compact requires that the States beneficially use all waters they 
divert in the Basin,121 and “[t]he principal function of the beneficial use 
doctrine is to prevent waste.”122 Thus, the rule against waste must be 
applied to CBM groundwater withdrawals that deplete the surface waters 
of the Tongue and Powder Rivers. As discussed in Part II above, annual 
CBM pumping in the Basin withdraws billions of gallons of groundwater 
 120 Although CBM producers may have the option of discharging the by-product water into 
surface waters, this discharge requires a permit under the Clean Water Act and may have to be 
treated to qualify for a permit. N. Plains Res. Council v. Fidelity Exploration & Dev. Co., 325 F.3d 
1155 (9th Cir. 2003). Thus, the turning back of water is typically rejected in favor of more 
economically expedient disposal methods such as reservoir storage. JOHN A. VEIL, U.S. DEPT. OF 
ENERGY, REGULATORY ISSUES AFFECTING MANAGEMENT OF PRODUCED WATER FROM COAL BED 
METHANE WELLS 4 (2002), available at www.netl.doe.gov/kmd/cds/disk2/RegulatoryIssues.pdf 
(“Operators are likely to select the least-cost options that are authorized by state permitting 
authorities.”); see also ALL CONSULTING & MONT. BD. OF OIL & GAS CONSERV., HANDBOOK ON 
BEST MANAGEMENT PRACTICES AND MITIGATION STRATEGIES FOR COAL BED METHANE IN THE 
MONTANA PORTION OF THE POWDER RIVER BASIN 28 (Apr. 2002), available at 
fossil.energy.gov/programs/oilgas/environment/publications/BMPHandbookFinal.pdf [hereinafter 
BEST MANAGEMENT PRACTICES] (describing impoundments). 
 121 See discussion supra Parts I.A and III.A. 
 122 A. DAN TARLOCK, LAW OF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES §§ 5:67–68 (2011); see also 
2-12 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 12.02 (Robert E. Beck & Amy K. Kelley eds., 3d ed. 2010) 
(noting that “water must be put to [beneficial] use and not ‘let run to waste’”); 94 C.J.S. Waters § 
395 (2011) (noting that the “rule limiting the prior appropriator to the amount reasonably necessary 
for the purposes of the appropriation places him or her under a duty to avoid waste and use 
reasonable care and economy to prevent unnecessary loss in the diversion and use of the water”). 
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that have a high likelihood of surface water connectivity.123 The States 
permit this pumping without an advance review of either the 
wastefulness associated with the CBM wells or the subsequent 
wastefulness that occurs during disposal of CBM by-product water. 
While the use of water is admittedly never one hundred percent 
efficient, there is a point at which waste becomes too great to be 
permitted under the law. A water user cannot command excessive 
amounts of water, even for an underlying beneficial use.124 Nor can a 
user simply store away water or run water across the surface of the land 
at the expense of water rights holders who need water for beneficial use. 
As Justice Cardozo concluded in the Walla Walla River interstate waters 
dispute, “There must be no waste in arid lands of the ‘treasure’ of a river. 
The essence of the doctrine of prior appropriation is beneficial 
use . . . .”125 A full century earlier, the U.S. Supreme Court held that an 
“appropriation does not confer such an absolute right to the body of the 
water diverted that the owner can allow it, after its diversion, to run to 
waste and prevent others from using it . . . .”126 
The Wyoming Supreme Court echoed this sentiment in a state case 
on waste: “It is the diversion of more water than can be consumed in 
good faith . . . which creates the wasteful, non-beneficial use situation 
now before us.”127 The court continued by pointing out that the water 
user’s duty includes “careful management and use, without wastage.”128 
Wyoming’s statutory and regulatory schemes echo these same 
admonitions against waste.129 
 123 See supra notes 6 and 68-77, and related discussion. 
 124 A classic case on point is Shodde v. Twin Falls Land & Water Co., 224 U.S. 107 (1912), 
wherein an Idaho irrigator unsuccessfully argued he was entitled to the flow of the Snake River 
beyond his actual water right to operate a water wheel apparatus that would lift water by buckets 
onto his elevated fields. The U.S. Supreme Court held that his water right was limited to the amount 
he could beneficially use, and he could not take surplus water just to operate his lift system. Id. at 
123-26. 
 125 Washington v. Oregon, 297 U.S. 517, 527 (1936) (internal citations omitted). 
 126 Atchison v. Peterson, 87 U.S. 507, 514 (1874). 
 127 Basin Elec. Power Coop. v. State Bd. of Control, 578 P.2d 557, 569 (Wyo. 1978). 
 128 Id. at 573. 
 129 E.g., WYO. STAT. ANN. § 41-2-111 (Westlaw 2011) (authorizing the Wyoming Attorney 
General to bring suit to prevent the waste of waters); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 41-3-909 (Westlaw 2011) 
(giving the State Engineer power to prevent the waste of underground waters); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 
41-3-912 (Westlaw 2011) (permitting the creation of underground control areas to address the 
wasting of groundwater); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 41-3-603 (Westlaw 2011) (“The water commissioner 
[of a water district] shall, as near as may be practicable, divide, regulate and control the use of the 
water of all streams, springs, lakes or other sources of water within his district as will prevent the 
waste of water or its use in excess of the volume to which the appropriator is lawfully entitled.”); 
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-501 (Westlaw 2011) (requiring beneficial use and prohibiting an 
unpermitted diversion that is “to the detriment of others”). 
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Montana similarly upholds the notions of beneficial use and non-
waste. In the seminal decision of Power v. Switzer,130 the Montana 
Supreme Court in 1898 held that a landowner who allowed unused water 
to run across an open field was not beneficially using the water and had 
to limit its diversion to beneficial use to prevent harm to junior users. 
The court held: 
[A]s the settlement of the [arid] country has advanced, the great value 
of the use of water has become more and more apparent. Legislation 
and judicial exposition have, accordingly, proceeded with increasing 
caution to restrict appropriations to spheres of usefulness and 
beneficial purposes. As a result, the law, crystallized in statutory form, 
is that an appropriation of a right to the use of running water flowing 
in the creeks must be for some useful or beneficial purpose . . . .131 
Here too the doctrine has found its way into Montana’s statutory 
and regulatory law,132 including the Water Use Act’s first sentence, 
which states, “The general welfare of the people of Montana, in view of 
the state’s population growth and expanding economy, requires that 
water resources of the state be put to optimum beneficial use and not 
wasted.”133 Montana’s definition of waste includes “the unreasonable 
loss of water” or “the application of water to anything but a beneficial 
use.”134 For several decades, Montana statutes have also provided that 
“no ground water may be wasted.”135 
Coalbed methane has created a gaping hole in the traditional rule 
against waste—a rule existing before, during, and after the creation of 
the Compact—that undermines the very notion of beneficial use.136 In 
 130 Power v. Switzer, 21 Mont. 523, 55 P. 32 (1898). 
 131 Id. at 529, 55 P. at 35. 
 132 E.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-114 (Westlaw 2011) (authorizing DNRC to petition the 
court to prevent a person from “wasting water, using water unlawfully, [or] preventing water from 
moving to another person having a prior right to use the water.”); MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-312 
(1)(a) (Westlaw 2011) (“The department . . . may not issue a permit for more water . . . than can be 
beneficially used without waste for the purpose stated in the application.); MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-
2-406 (Westlaw 2011) (allowing the district court to modify permits in the event of waste); MONT. 
CODE ANN. § 85-2-412 (Westlaw 2011) (requiring persons diverting surplus water “over and above 
what is actually and necessarily used by the prior appropriator . . . to turn and cause to flow back into 
the stream the surplus water.”); MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-505 (Westlaw 2011) (prohibiting the 
waste of groundwater, with enumerated exemptions). 
 133 MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-1-101(1) (Westlaw 2011). 
 134 MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-102(23) (Westlaw 2011). 
 135 MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-505 (Westlaw 2011) (prohibiting the waste of groundwater, 
with enumerated exemptions). This provision was adopted in 1961, codified as Rev. Code Mont. § 
89-2926, when the state first enacted permitting requirements for groundwater. 
 136 For a sampling of scholarship making this point, see, for example, Barrett, supra note 51, 
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2001 the Montana Legislature specifically exempted CBM groundwater 
withdrawals from the statutory waste prohibition.137 CBM groundwater 
withdrawal is also placed entirely outside of the water rights permitting 
process. Instead, the Montana Board of Oil and Gas Conservation 
(MBOGC) exercises exclusive jurisdiction and makes no beneficial use 
determination.138 The Montana Department of Natural Resources and 
Conservation (MDNRC) becomes involved only if a CBM producer later 
wants to apply the by-product water to another use.139 Further, CBM 
producers are allowed to simply store the by-product water, without ever 
putting it to a beneficial use. This storage violates the traditional prior 
appropriation rule that “storage itself is not a beneficial use; storage is a 
means to apply water to a beneficial use.”140 
Wyoming has taken only a slightly different tack. In the absence of 
statutes on point, the Wyoming State Engineer has determined that CBM 
groundwater pumping to enable CBM production is a beneficial use 
requiring a permit.141 These groundwater permits, however, are granted 
“as a matter of course,”142 without any analysis of waste. And when the 
CBM by-product water will be discharged without further use, no permit 
is required for the discharge.143 Similarly, reservoir storage of CBM 
produced groundwater, another popular disposal method among CBM 
producers,144 is not required to be applied to a beneficial use.145 Neither 
is there a beneficial use requirement for groundwater reinjected into 
aquifers.146 In fact, Wyoming’s regulations specifically exclude CBM 
by-product groundwater from being stored underground for later 
at 10681 (“The ‘beneficial use’ model . . . fails to account for the massive quantities of produced 
water that often cannot be beneficially used in the traditional sense . . . .”); Murphy, supra note 82, at 
409 (disposing of CBM by-product water without beneficial use is wasteful); MacKinnon & Fox, 
supra note 51, at 378-84 (critiquing the lack of review of waste under Wyoming’s permitting 
scheme). 
 137 MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-505(1)(e) (Westlaw 2011). This exemption was passed as part 
of Montana Laws 2001, ch. 578, § 5. 
 138 MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-510 (Westlaw 2011). 
 139 MONT. CODE ANN. § 82-11-175(2)(a) (Westlaw 2011). 
 140 LAW OF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES, supra note 122, at § 5:37. 
 141 Revised Interim Policy Memo from Patrick T. Tyrrell, supra note 84. 
 142 WYO. STAT. ANN. § 41-3-931 (Westlaw 2011). 
 143 See generally WYOMING STATE ENGINEER’S OFFICE, GUIDANCE: CBM/GROUND WATER 
PERMITS (Mar. 2004), available at seo.state.wy.us/PDF/GW_CBM%20Guidance.pdf; Revised 
Interim Policy Memo from Patrick T. Tyrrell, supra note 84. The process is summarized in Dennis 
Stickley & Lawrence J. MacDonnell, Wyoming's Legal Framework for Management of Water 
Produced in Conjunction with Coal Bed Methane, 32 WYO. LAW. 24, 25 (Oct. 2009). 
 144 BEST MANAGEMENT PRACTICES, supra note 120, at 31. 
 145 WYO. CODE REG., General Agency, Board or Commission Rules, ch. 4, § 1 (Westlaw 
2011). 
 146 Id. 
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ne to avoid waste: 
 
beneficial use.147 Thus, there are several methods by which CBM by-
product water can be legally disposed of in Wyoming without being put 
to a beneficial use. Even in those rare instances when a CBM producer 
may choose to beneficially use the by-product water,148 the damage and 
waste caused by the initial groundwater pumping has already taken 
place. Commentators reviewing the Wyoming permitting process have 
observed that more must be do
[The State Engineer’s Office should be] examining and properly 
limiting the quantity of water produced in association with the 
methane gas production process and ensuring that the water so 
produced is, as far as possible, put to further beneficial use or made 
available for future use. . . . 
 
[W]e propose that the concept of beneficial use should be rigorously 
applied to CBM water to avoid waste of water.  The SEO should take 
the requisite step, as was taken with surface water irrigation, and 
establish in effect a “duty of water” for CBM.149 
Neither the Wyoming nor the Montana Supreme Court has ruled 
upon whether the CBM statutes in their respective jurisdictions comply 
with prior appropriation principles. In Montana, three district court 
decisions have signaled a possible shift. The first decision concluded that 
the MBOGC must consult with the MDNRC to ensure water rights are 
protected in the course of MBOGC’s approval of CBM wells.150 The 
district court cited the “anticipated impacts, whether real or imagined, of 
substantial dewatering of aquifers” as the justification for this 
consultation and the reason why CBM waste needs to be treated 
differently than other, more de minimis, forms of waste exempted from 
the State’s anti-waste statute.151 The court noted that CBM extraction 
“dwarfs the amounts of water” contemplated by the other statutory 
exemptions.152 The court also held that all methods of CBM groundwater 
 147 WYO. CODE REG., Water Quality, ch. 16, app. A (Westlaw 2011). While this protection 
makes sense from a water quality perspective, there are negative repercussions from a water quantity 
perspective. Further, while reinjection into an aquifer is allowed, there is no assurance that the 
reinjection will be into the same aquifer or that the reinjection will in fact protect senior water rights 
holders in the Yellowstone River Basin. Id. at ch. 16, § 8(c)(ii). 
 148 WYO. STAT. ANN. § 41-3-904 (Westlaw 2011). 
 149 MacKinnon & Fox, supra note 51, at 378-84. 
 150 Diamond Cross Props., LLC v. State, No. DV05-70, 2008 Mont. Dist. Lexis 180 (Mont. 
22d Jud. Dist. July 14, 2008). 
 151 Id. at *16 (citing MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-505(1)(e)). 
 152 Id. Other exempt uses include withdrawing water from test wells, temporarily losing water 
from damaged wells that are diligently repaired, draining water off lands, removing water that is 
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disposal must result in beneficial use of water, which would eliminate the 
mere storage of by-product water.153 Absent these steps, the court 
expressed concern that the CBM well permitting process could violate 
the Montana Constitution’s requirement of beneficial use according to 
the principles of prior appropriation.154 
Another Montana district court concluded that applications to use 
CBM by-product water must analyze the water as groundwater rather 
than surface water.155 This holding would require applicants to address 
the groundwater’s connection to surface waters and prove that there is no 
injury to existing water rights users.156 And in a separate case, that same 
district court held that CBM evaporation ponds that are not put to 
beneficial use violate Montana law.157 It remains to be seen whether 
these rulings will be affirmed or result in statewide changes in the law. 
On the Wyoming side of the ledger, a CBM challenge did reach the 
Wyoming Supreme Court in a case where neighboring ranchers alleged, 
inter alia, that the State of Wyoming illegally authorized CBM 
groundwater pumping without considering beneficial use or waste and 
without providing neighboring landowners with notice and an 
opportunity to object.158 Among their alleged damages, the ranchers 
asserted lost vegetation, soil damage, and depleted well supplies.159 
Although the court dismissed the case for lack of a justiciable 
controversy,160 it issued this cautionary note: 
By ruling that the Court does not have jurisdiction over the case, we 
do not want to leave the impression that we approve of the State’s 
administration of CBM water. West and Turner raise serious 
allegations of damages to their property from CBM water and failures 
on the part of the State to properly regulate CBM water statewide.161 
The judiciary’s growing discomfort with CBM regulations is clear. 
interfering with traditional mining operations, or eliminating water used in traditional mining 
operations. MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-505(1)(e) (Westlaw 2011). 
 153 Id. at *22. 
 154 Id. (citing MONT. CONST. art. IX, § 3). 
 155 See generally N. Plains Res. Council, Inc. v. Montana Dep’t of Natural Res. & 
Conservation, No. CDV-2007-425 (Mont. 1st Jud. Dist. Dec. 15, 2008), discussed supra note 118. 
 156 MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-311(1) (Westlaw 2011). 
 157 Tongue & Yellowstone Irrigation Dist. v. Montana Bd. of Oil and Gas Conservation, No. 
BDV-2003-579, 2010 Mont. Dist. Lexis 116, at *17–18 (Mont. 1st Jud. Dist. Mar. 5, 2010). 
 158 William F. West Ranch, LLC v. Tyrrell, 2009 WY 62, ¶ 21, 206 P.3d 722, ¶ 21 (Wyo. 
2009). 
 159 Id. ¶ 25. 
 160 Id. ¶ 22. 
 161 Id. ¶ 48. 
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 specify: 
 
Although we see strong signals that these regulatory schemes may not 
withstand judicial scrutiny, we have no certainty of the timeline under 
which future state court rulings will issue. In the meantime, the States 
continue to permit vast quantities of Basin groundwaters to be withdrawn 
under suspect regulatory schemes that violate the no-waste rule and, 
when there is surface water connectivity, the Compact. The Special 
Master and the U.S. Supreme Court are thus uniquely situated to stop the 
waste of Basin waters. 
ii. CBM Groundwater Pumping Violates the No-Injury Rule of Prior 
Appropriation 
Under the prior appropriation doctrine, it is axiomatic that a new 
water user may not take water that belongs to an existing water rights 
user―the “no injury” rule.162 In his First Interim Report, the Special 
Master concluded that the prior appropriation doctrine has evolved to 
include hydrologically connected groundwater.163 As evidence of this 
evolution, he noted that both Wyoming and Montana have included 
groundwater within their water rights permitting systems.164 Yet when it 
comes to CBM production, both States’ regulatory systems openly 
violate the no-injury rule by failing to consider whether CBM wells 
deplete water belonging to water rights users.165 
While the Wyoming State Engineer has concluded that CBM 
groundwater pumping is a beneficial use requiring a permit, Wyoming 
does not review the permit applications in advance for injury. Instead, 
the permit is typically granted “as a matter of course,”166 with a 
condition requiring no injury.167 Wyoming groundwater permits
 162 LAW OF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES, supra note 122, at § 5.15; 2-12 WATERS AND 
WATER RIGHTS, supra note 122, at § 17.02 (“Interference with water rights by other appropriators or 
would-be appropriators gives rise to statutory and common law protection for holders of senior water 
rights. . . . This right of protection against interference with appropriative rights has long been 
recognized as fundamental law by the courts and writers.”). 
 163 See supra notes 56-59 and related discussion. 
 164 See supra notes 56-59 and related discussion. 
 165 For a sampling of scholarship making this point, see, e.g., Murphy, supra note 82, at 408 
(noting concerns about impacts to water rights as “aquifers are depleted”); Valorz, supra note 82, at 
135-36 (concluding that Wyoming’s State Engineer is failing to ensure that existing water rights are 
protected); Eric Waeckerlin, Case Note, The New Border War: CBM Development in the Powder 
River Basin of Wyoming and Montana, 26 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. 149, 156 (2005) 
(observing that irrigators and other surface water rights users are at risk from CBM production). 
 166 WYO. STAT. ANN. § 41-3-931 (Westlaw 2011). 
 167 Form U.W.5, Application for Permit to Appropriate Ground Water 2 (2009), available at 
seo.state.wy.us/PDF/UW5_0909.pdf. 
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This application is approved subject to the condition that the proposed 
use shall not interfere with any existing rights to ground water from 
the same source of supply and is subject to regulation and correlation 
with surface water rights, if the ground and surface waters are 
interconnected.168 
Advance notice is not required before the permit issues, so little 
opportunity exists for water rights users to raise issues of injury in 
advance.169 The burden thus shifts to the injured water rights user to 
assert an injury after it has occurred.170 The injured user may be facing 
major water depletions that are harming her livelihood, yet she is asked 
to bear the financial costs of proving that CBM production caused her 
injury―no small task in the hyrdologically complex Powder River 
Basin. For all practical purposes, Wyoming has relinquished its 
responsibility to protect senior water rights users from CBM production 
and has left those users to fend for themselves. 
The picture in Montana is equally concerning. The Montana Water 
Use Act generally requires applicants for new groundwater uses to show, 
inter alia, that water is legally and physically available and that “the 
water rights of a prior appropriator under an existing water right, a 
certificate, a permit, or a state water reservation will not be adversely 
affected.”171 But CBM wells are exempted from the Water Use Act, and 
the MBOGC, which has jurisdiction over CBM wells, does not apply the 
Act’s review criteria.172 Even in those limited situations when the 
MDRNC reviews beneficial uses of CBM by-product water, the agency 
has created a legal fiction that the “source” of the water right is the 
above-ground pipeline in which the by-product water is stored.173 Thus, 
Montana does not review the initial CBM groundwater extraction for 
injury to either surface or groundwater rights users. 
 168 Id. 
 169 This lack of notice was one basis of the litigation in William F. West Ranch, LLC v. 
Tyrrell, 206 P.3d 722 (Wyo. 2009). See discussion supra notes 158-161 and accompanying text. 
 170 Establishing an injury does not guarantee that an adequate remedy will result. As noted 
above in Part II, the damage to the water resource may appear long after the CBM well has been 
capped and the producer has moved on. 
 171 MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-311(1)(a), (b) (Westlaw 2011). 
 172 See supra notes 138-139 and accompanying text. 
 173 Order on Scope of Issues for Hearing, Application Nos. 42B-30011045 and 42B-30014358 
for Beneficial Water Use Permit by Fidelity Exploration 2–3 (Jan. 3, 2007), available at 
www.dnrc.mt.gov/wrd/water_rts/hearing_info/significant_hearingdecisions/fidelity_order-
hearingexaminer.pdf. One district court has held that this legal fiction is legally and factually 
incorrect, and that MDNRC should review applications for use of CBM by-product water as 
groundwater applications and also then analyze injury to users due to that groundwater withdrawal. 
N. Plains Res. Council, Inc. v. Montana Dep’t of Natural Res. & Conservation, No. CDV-2007-425 
(Mont. 1st Jud. Dist. Dec. 15, 2008) (on file with author). 
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As is the case in Wyoming, injured water rights users in Montana 
are also left to fend for themselves. At first blush, Montana does appear 
to provide limited protection by statutorily requiring CBM producers to 
“offer” water mitigation agreements to injured well owners within a 
“circle of influence” (COI) area around a CBM well.174 But the balance 
of power seems greatly tilted toward the CBM producer to determine 
both whether there is an injury and what mitigation is appropriate. And, 
turning the no-injury rule on its head, the statute suggests that the CBM 
producer ultimately gets to take the senior water user’s groundwater in 
exchange for some unspecified form of “mitigation.”175 This is 
tantamount to permitting a CBM company to condemn a water right 
without going through eminent domain procedures or paying just 
compensation. Injured surface water users―those who would be 
protected under the Compact―are left to their own devices since the 
CBM laws fail to even consider them at all. 
Scientists have questioned the “circle of influence” approach to 
injury because it does not reflect the hydrologic reality of Basin-wide 
CBM groundwater drawdowns.176 In commenting on the proposed use of 
COI mitigation in the Basin, one senior geologist observed the following: 
[G]roundwater models indicate that the drawdown caused by CBM 
development is regional in nature. In other words, the CBM 
development causes drawdown that extends across the basin—the 
entire Powder River Basin becomes one gigantic gas field. The 
groundwater models indicate that the drawdown is tied collectively to 
the entire development. However, damage to a water well, as defined 
by the water well agreement, is tied to the well within the circle of 
influence of a CBM well (or wells) . . . . There will be places in the 
 174 MONT. CODE ANN. § 82-11-175(3) (Westlaw 2011); see also WATER RESOURCES 
DIVISION, MONTANA DNRC, MONTANA’S BASIN CLOSURES AND CONTROLLED GROUNDWATER 
AREAS 23–24 (Dec. 2003), available at dnrc.mt.gov/wrd/water_rts/appro_info/basinclose-
cgw_areas.pdf (requiring similar mitigation within a controlled groundwater area in the Powder 
River Basin). 
 175 MONT. CODE ANN. § 82-11-175(3) (Westlaw 2011). 
 176 For example, Wyoming geologist Walter Merschat was quoted in Powder River Breaks as 
follows: 
Merschat also dismissed the use of a “circle of influence” around a well to artificially limit 
the area in which a well is believed to affect groundwater supply. “It is unfortunate that the 
COI has been adopted to define the limits that CBM dewatering activities impact 
groundwater,” he wrote. “Groundwater flows downhill through subsurface reservoirs and its 
movement is based on rock fabric, not a circle on the surface. Therefore, the aerial extent of 
CBM dewatering is more widespread and complex than a simple circle on a map.” 
Experts Cite CBM Threats in Fortification Area, 35 POWDER RIVER BREAKS, July-Aug. 2007, at 3, 
available at www.powderriverbasin.org/assets/Uploads/files/publications/2007/breaksjulyaug07.pdf. 
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CBM developed portion of the Powder River Basin where there is no 
operating CBM well within [the COI], yet where the groundwater 
models predict a decline in the Fort Union water level of more than 
several hundred feet. In other words, there may be no active CBM 
well within [the COI] of an impacted water well; the impact is caused 
by the collective CBM development.177 
It is difficult to imagine a scenario where Basin-wide aquifer 
drawdowns of several hundred feet do not impact both surface and 
groundwater users in the Tongue and Power River basins. This high 
likelihood of injury makes the need for advance review of injury all the 
greater. 
In summary, the States have created an extraordinary exemption for 
CBM development that undermines the very tenets of prior appropriation 
law as we know it. They are permitting CBM wells without advance 
review of groundwater-surface water connectivity, without advance 
review of waste, and without advance review of injury to water rights 
users. CBM producers in Wyoming and Montana may well be drawing 
down surface water supplies belonging to both pre- and post-1950 water 
rights holders in violation of the Compact. By identifying those CBM 
regulations that offend the Compact, the U.S. Supreme Court and the 
Special Master can provide clear guidance to the States’ and help set the 
stage for a better CBM management regime―a regime that could serve 
as a guide for other western states as well. The key scientific components 
of that CBM management regime, which are a necessary part of any 
remedy in the Montana v. Wyoming litigation, are described next. 
C. AN ADEQUATE REMEDY MUST INCLUDE DECISIONMAKING AND 
MANAGEMENT BASED ON SOUND GROUNDWATER SCIENCE 
In the final step toward Compact compliance, the U.S. Supreme 
Court and the Special Master should identify the basic scientific 
requirements necessary to ensure the States honor the Compact’s 
equitable division of waters during their development of CBM. At this 
point, it is tempting to consider the possibility that the States may, 
through settlement talks, be able to resolve the scientific approaches they 
wish to take. Nonetheless, we must remain mindful that it was the 
parties’ inability to resolve their differences that resulted in the 
 177 Comments on Wyoming & Montana Final Environmental Impact Statement on the 
development of Coal-Bed Methane at 7 (undated), submitted by John Bredehoeft, Ph.D. [hereinafter 
Bredehoeft Final EIS Comments], available at www.powderriverbasin.org/assets/Uploads/files/ 
final/expertfeisjohnbredehoeft.pdf. 
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proceeding being filed before the U.S. Supreme Court.178 Moreover, the 
economic incentives are skewed in such a way that the States may 
forestall addressing CBM issues in favor of allowing the economic 
benefits of CBM development to continue. Although the parties may 
eventually be in a position to negotiate the finer points of a CBM 
management program, the Special Master can provide an important 
starting place for negotiations by stating the essential scientific 
requirements that a CBM management program must contain for 
purposes of Compact compliance. In so doing, the Special Master will 
also be benefitting the other western states that share interstate CBM 
basins as well. 
Briefly, the essential scientific requirements for Compact 
compliance should include: 
Reliable surface-groundwater modeling and data collection that is 
shared and stored in databases accessible to both parties; 
A scientific threshold for determining when surface and groundwater 
are considered “connected”; 
Advance analysis of injury, using science-based data, before a CBM 
well is permitted; 
Consideration of cumulative impacts and longevity of impacts when 
considering injury during CBM well permitting; 
Mitigation that protects the quantity, quality, and timing of water use 
to which water rights holders are entitled under the Compact; and 
Ongoing monitoring and active management of waters impacted by 
CBM groundwater pumping. 
If these basic scientific requirements are stated as an essential 
component of the remedy in Montana v. Wyoming, then the parties will 
be responsible for resolving how to implement the requirements over the 
long term. What follows is a brief rationale for why these scientific 
requirements are necessary, as well as some possible directions that the 
parties could take in their implementation. 
Surface-Groundwater Modeling and Data Collection. Leshy 
describes groundwater modeling as “an essential tool to manage 
groundwater intelligently.”179 Indeed, any fair and equitable remedy 
must emanate from a body of accurate scientific models and data 
concerning groundwater-surface water connectivity in the Basin, 
beginning with the areas where CBM development is occurring most 
heavily and moving into other areas of anticipated CBM ground
 178 Brief in Support of Motion, supra note 15, at 2, 26–27. 
 179 Leshy, supra note 67, at 1479. 
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The National Research Council (NRC) recently concluded that to 
meaningfully evaluate various management options for CBM 
groundwater withdrawals, “data to determine the connectivity of 
groundwater and surface water and groundwater modeling are 
necessary.”180 The NRC goes on to note that data gaps exist in the 
Powder River Basin and that existing data is not compiled into common, 
accessible databases. The NRC observes that this data is critical to 
testing the results of groundwater modeling “to establish a level of 
reliability that is suitable for making management decisions.”181 Absent 
field data, hydrogeologic models may yield inaccurate results that fail to 
account for “complex water-rock interactions, differe
erties, or boundary conditions in CBM basins.”182 
The concept of groundwater modeling and data collection is not 
new in compact administration. In a Final Settlement Stipulation among 
Colorado, Nebraska, and Kansas, those states agreed to settle a dispute 
under the Republican River Compact by identifying specific accounting 
practices, reporting practices, data sharing, and groundwater modeling 
protocols that would address groundwater depletions of surface water on 
the Republican River.183 Additionally, Lawrence MacDonnell, in writing 
on the feasibility of greater surface-groundwater regulation in Wyoming, 
notes several other successful examples of groundwater modeling in the 
West—modeling that ultimately helps “promote the most effective use of 
the available water supply.”184 Colorado in particular has made strides by 
designating key CBM study areas where it is determining wh
ndwater pumping is depleting surface water supplies.185 
Further, although the Yellowstone River Compact does not address 
federal or Indian reserved water rights, the Basin contains large 
 180 COALBED METHANE PRODUCED WATER, supra note 1, at 47. 
 181 Id. at 7, 49. 
 182 Id. 
 183 Final Settlement Stipulation, Kansas v. Nebraska (No. 126, Orig.) (Dec. 15, 2002)), 
available at www.ksda.gov/includes/document_center/interstate_water_issues/RRC_Docs/ 
RR_Settlement_Stipulation176.pdf. It should be noted that Kansas has sued Nebraska for violating 
this Stipulation based on the data revealed by the accounting reported under the groundwater 
modeling since the parties entered into the Stipulation. See generally Kansas Motion for Leave to 
File Petition, Petition, and Brief in Support (No. 126, Orig.) (May 3, 2010), available at 
www.pierceatwood.com/files/9389_2010-05-
03_KansasMotionforLeavetoFilePetitionPetitionandBriefinSupport.pdf. 
 184 See MacDonnell, supra note 67, at 62 (citing examples from Colorado, Idaho, 
Washington, and Arizona). 
 185 See Colorado Geological Survey, Water Depletion as a Result of Coalbed Methane 
Production in Colorado, geosurvey.state.co.us/water/CBM%20Water%20Depletion/Pages/ 
CBMWaterDepletion.aspx (last visited Mar. 12, 2012). 
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ar to be essential partners in this modeling and data gathering 
ende
ote to significant 
enou
reater than 
landholdings belonging to the federal government and the Crow Tribe 
and Northern Cheyenne Tribe.186 The Environmental Impact Statements 
for CBM development on federal lands already demonstrate the federal 
government’s use of groundwater modeling to assess impacts of CBM 
development on federal lands.187 Because CBM and water resources 
cross through these jurisdictional boundaries, the federal government and 
Tribes appe
avor. 
Thresholds for Determining Connectivity. To properly analyze 
impacts to Compact water rights users, it is important to quantitatively 
establish the “extent to which CBM-producing formations hydraulically 
connect to surface waters and major aquifers.”188 The scientific 
community generally recognizes the principle that all groundwater, at 
some point, connects to surface water.189 Thus, the States must identify 
the point at which connectivity transitions from rem
gh to measurably impact surface water rights. 
Here, the parties have an example in the settlement reached among 
Wyoming, Nebraska, and Colorado resolving a surface water-
groundwater dispute under the North Platte Compact.190 In that case, the 
parties stipulated that “[a] hydrologically connected groundwater well is 
one that is so located and constructed that if water were intentionally 
withdrawn by the well continuously for 40 years, the cumulative stream 
depletion would be greater than or equal to 28% of the total groundwater 
withdrawn by the well.”191 Colorado state law provides another 
alternative. There, groundwater is presumed to be “tributary” to surface 
water unless the applicant for groundwater use proves that the 
withdrawal will not “within one hundred years of continuous withdrawal, 
deplete the flow of a natural stream . . . at an annual rate g
 
 186 See T.T. TABER & S.A. KINNEY, LAND USE AND OWNERSHIP, POWDER RIVER BASIN, U.S. 
GEOLOGICAL SURVEY PROFESSIONAL PAPER 1625-A, at figs. PM-2 and PM-3 (1999), available at 
pubs.usgs.gov/pp/p1625a/Chapters/PM.pdf (assessing tertiary coal beds and zones by surface and 
xample, the Wyoming and Montana EIS documents for the Powder River Basin, 
upra 
, available at 
ubs.u
ter 
ov/NorthPlatte/Settlement/108FinalReport.pdf (discussed in MacDonnell, supra 
underlying ownership). 
 187 See, for e
s notes 79-80. 
 188 COALBED METHANE PRODUCED WATER, supra note 1, at 48. 
 189 E.g., THOMAS C. WINTER ET AL., U.S. DEPT. OF INTERIOR, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, 
GROUND WATER AND SURFACE WATER: A SINGLE RESOURCE 1 (1998)
p sgs.gov/circ/circ1139/pdf/circ1139.pdf; MacDonnell, supra note 67, at 62. 
 190 E.g., Nebraska v. Wyoming, 534 U.S. 40 (2001) (settling a dispute involving groundwa
depletions under the North Platte Compact) (discussed in MacDonnell, supra note 67, at 58–60). 
 191 Proposed Joint Settlement at 201, Nebraska v. Wyoming, 534 U.S. 40 (No. 108, Orig.), 
available at dnr.ne.g
note 67, at 58–60). 
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the extent of injury to existing water rights holders under the 
Com
 
deter
te th of one percent of the annual rate of withdrawal.”192 
 Advance Analysis of Injury. Consistent with prior appropriation 
principles, a CBM developer must provide an advance analysis of injury 
to water rights users before any CBM well permit is issued. Wyoming’s 
lack of advance analysis of harm under its CBM groundwater permits 
provides an inadequate remedy because the ensuing harm may be long-
term or irreversible once it occurs.193 Likewise, “circle of influence” 
approaches such as those taken by Montana are inadequate because they 
do not comport with groundwater science and fail to address surface 
water injuries.194 Thus, an entirely new approach to injury analysis is 
warranted—one that uses groundwater modeling and data in advance to 
determine 
pact. 
 Outside of CBM water use, Montana already inquires into the 
harm posed by other groundwater permit applicants and, further still, 
requires more extensive groundwater modeling (hyrdogeologic 
assessments) for groundwater permit applications in its closed, or over-
appropriated, basins.195 And while not perfect models, the regulatory 
approaches taken by the Canadian provinces of Alberta and British 
Columbia also demonstrate that it is possible to ask CBM developers in 
advance for water quality and water quantity data that is then used in
mining the impacts posed by the CBM groundwater withdrawals.196 
To the extent that a State lacks the necessary data to determine 
injury to other water users, then the path of the Hawaii Supreme Court, 
which has imposed the precautionary principle during water permitting, 
provides an appropriate analog. When Hawaii’s state water commission 
lacked sufficient evidence to determine whether water rights applicants 
 
 192 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37-90-103(10.5) (Westlaw 2011). A recent Colorado decision 
has now held that CBM groundwater withdrawals are beneficial uses subject to this requirement. See 
Vance v. Wolfe, 205 P.3d 1165, 1171 (Colo. 2009). 
 193 See discussion supra Parts II and III.B. 
 194 See discussion supra Part III.B. 
 195 MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-311 and -360 to -363 (Westlaw 2011). 
 196 ALBERTA ENVIRONMENT, GUIDELINES FOR GROUNDWATER DIVERSION FOR COALBED 
METHANE/NATURAL GAS IN COAL DEVELOPMENT 5–6 (Apr. 2004), available at 
environment.gov.ab.ca/info/library/7834.pdf [hereinafter ALBERTA GUIDELINES]; BRITISH 
COLUMBIA, CODE OF PRACTICE FOR THE DISCHARGE OF PRODUCED WATER FROM COALBED GAS 
OPERATIONS, B.C. Reg. 156/2005, § 11 (2005), available at www.bclaws.ca/EPLibraries/ 
bclaws_new/document/ID/freeside/17_156_2005. Both models are discussed in Allan Ingelson et al., 
CBM Produced Water―The Emerging Canadian Regulatory Framework, 10 U. DENV. WATER L. 
REV. 23, 31–32, 37–38 (2006). These models are imperfect because, among other issues, both focus 
mostly on water quality and groundwater impacts and underemphasize the impacts on water quantity 
and hydrologically connected surface waters. Further, neither model assures protection of existing 
water uses. Nonetheless, the proactive review built into both models demonstrates the feasibility of 
advance review of injury. 
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r the applicants to 
contribute to the costs of stream studies and monitoring before 
dete
ere uncertainty exists, a trustee’s duty 
 protect the resource mitigates in favor of choosing presumptions 
 scientific proof should not tie the 
Commission’s hands in adopting reasonable measures designed to 
ple and impose study requirements on CBM well 
appli
rights users under the Compact. Here too, the Province of Alberta 
 
could use water without causing public harm, the Hawaii Supreme Court 
held that it was appropriate for the commission to orde
rmining whether the permit criteria were satisfied: 
Where scientific evidence is preliminary and not yet conclusive . . . it 
is prudent to adopt “precautionary principles” in protecting the 
resource. That is, where there are present or potential threats of serious 
damage, lack of full scientific certainty should not be a basis for 
postponing effective measures to prevent environmental 
degradation . . . . In addition, wh
to
that also protect the resource. 
 
As with any general principle, its meaning must vary according to the 
situation and can only develop over time. In this case, we believe the 
Commission describes the principle in its quintessential form: at 
minimum, the absence of firm
further the public interest.197 
Because of the potential for long-term and irreversible harm from 
CBM groundwater pumping, it similarly makes sense to employ the 
precautionary princi
cants to ensure that no actual injury occurs to water rights users 
under the Compact. 
Determining Cumulative Impacts and Longevity of Impacts. Injury 
should not be analyzed on a well-by-well basis, but rather with an eye 
toward the cumulative impacts of multiple CBM wells pumping across a 
groundwater source. In his CBM Primer, Gary Bryner notes that “[t]he 
minimum threshold for a viable [CBM] project . . . depends on a variety 
of factors, but one estimate is that a new, remote basin requires at least 
400 wells or 200 billion cubic feet of production to be viable.”198 Basin 
geologist Joe Bredehoeft, citing to existing Basin groundwater models, 
has observed that the cumulative effect of these multiple wells “causes 
drawdown that extends across the basin—the entire Powder River Basin 
becomes one gigantic gas field” that can draw down an aquifer by as 
much as 100 feet.199 Thus, the States should not artificially limit their 
analysis to individual CBM wells when reviewing for injury to water 
 197 In re Water Use Permit Applications (Waiahole), 9 P.3d 409, 426-27, 495-96 (Haw. 2000). 
 198 CBM PRIMER, supra note 1, at 7. 
 199 Bredehoeft Final EIS Comments, supra note 177, at 7. 
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ders cumulative impacts 
as pa
d that long-term harm 
must
not only of replacement quantity but also of replacement quality,205 as 
provides an example of a jurisdiction that consi
rt of the initial CBM permitting process.200 
Further, as discussed in Part II above, the true impact of the CBM 
wells must be viewed over the long term, since the wells themselves 
have a very short life span.201 The rates of aquifer recharge will be 
significantly slower than the rates of CBM groundwater 
pumping―extending into the hundreds of years. Impacts will most likely 
continue long after a CBM well is abandoned,202 an
 be factored into the States’ review of injury. 
 Suitability Thresholds for Mitigation. The reality is that CBM 
development will continue into the foreseeable future because of its 
significance to national energy production and because of the economic 
benefits that return back to the States.203 This means that, to the extent 
CBM development is depleting Basin waters, the States will have to find 
new and creative ways to ensure water delivery to Compact water users 
while also allowing CBM development to occur. The creative use of 
storage, recharge, substitution and other types of replacement water 
mitigation is likely necessary to achieve Compact compliance. Indeed, 
because much of the CBM water in the Basin is of higher quality, it may 
serve useful in mitigation,204 provided that senior water rights holders do 
not suffer injury during the mitigation process. The States’ present 
mitigation systems, discussed in Part III.B above, will not adequately 
protect Compact water users because they leave mitigation to the 
discretion of the CBM company. True mitigation must include questions 
 
 200 ALBERTA GUIDELINES, supra note 162, at 8. 
 201 See discussion supra Part II; see also CBM PRIMER, supra note 1, at 7 (noting that wells 
pica ickly pumped and then 
band
ing the economic 
enefi  landowners); CBM PRIMER, supra note 1, at 1 
otin
ty lly produce gas for seven to ten years, and “basins may be relatively qu
a oned”). 
 202 CBM PRIMER, supra note 1, at 7; see also discussion supra Part II. 
 203 See, e.g., Rod De Bruin, Wyoming Oil and Gas, WYOMING STATE GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, 
www.wsgs.uwyo.edu/AboutWSGS/oil_and_gas.aspx (last visited Mar. 12, 2012) (“In fiscal year 
2006, oil and gas production contributed more than $2.2 billion to state and local governments in 
severance and property taxes, federal and state royalties, conservation mill levy, and sales and use 
taxes.”); see also DE BRUIN ET AL., supra note 76, at 20–21 (generally outlin
b ts to government and private businesses and
(n g CBM as a central resource to the security of our national energy supply). 
 204 CBM PRIMER, supra note 1, at 13 fig.9. 
 205 Under prior appropriation, a water right included not only quantity, but also quality 
sufficient to support the water use. City of Helena v. Rogan, 26 Mont. 452, 470, 68 P. 798, 800 
(1902) (recognizing that a water rights holder has the right to have water of “such quality as will 
meet his needs as protected by his water right”); see also Sussex Land & Live Stock Co. v. Midwest 
Refining Co., 294 F. 597, 603 (1923) (under the Wyoming Constitution, a water right includes “the 
quality as well as the quantity” (quoting Arizona Copper Co. v. Gillespie, 230 U.S. 46, 57 (1913)). 
While this Article has necessarily focused on quantity due to the nature of the claims in Montana v. 
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well as the timeliness and convenience of water delivery. These are 
questions that the States, rather than CBM developers, should resolve in 
advance of permitting a CBM well, so that the water users protected by 
the Compact are not left in a worse position than they were in prior to 
approval of a CBM well. 
Monitoring and Active Water Area Management. Data-gathering for 
CBM well analysis should extend beyond the permitting stage to ongoing 
monitoring of the wells in the field. Ongoing monitoring ensures the 
injury does not grow beyond that predicted during the initial review of 
the CBM well application. This ongoing data gathering also further fills 
the Basin’s data gaps, continuing to improve the accuracy of the 
groundwater modeling on which the parties will rely. Here, Basin 
geologist John Bredehoeft recommends that: 
There should be a monitoring program designed to document the 
impact of CBM production on the deep aquifers of the Powder River 
Basin. If we are to see the total impact of the development (drawdown 
and recovery) the monitoring needs to be sustained into the later part 
of the 21st Century—at least to the year 2060. There will be pressure 
to discontinue the monitoring once the CBM wells are plugged and 
abandoned and the CBM operators are gone.206 
Bredehoeft goes on to suggest that the monitoring include: 
sufficient monitoring wells appropriately located to obtain an accurate 
picture of drawdown in the Basin; a select number of “continuous 
monitoring” stations that generate “digital data collected at 15-minute 
intervals”; and a records database “that is kept up to date and accessible 
on the Internet.”207 
This monitoring is best achieved within the context of actively 
managed water areas that geographically encompass the places that CBM 
groundwater withdrawals are impacting Compact rights. Both States 
currently have statutes that could be adapted for such use. In Wyoming, 
the State has authority to create “control areas” when there is insufficient 
water to meet the needs of appropriators, when conflicts in use are 
occurring, or when there is waste of water.208 Within these areas, wells 
are closely monitored for harm to other users, withdrawals may be 
curtailed or reduced, rotations in use may be imposed, and wells may be 
Wyoming, the remedy would be wholly inadequate if CBM developers could mitigate harm by 
supplying substitute waters of inferior quality that could not support the irrigation, livestock, and 
domestic uses of the Basin. 
 206 Bredehoeft Final EIS Comments, supra note 177, at 9. 
 207 Id. at 10. 
 208 WYO. STAT. ANN. § 41-3-912 (Westlaw 2011). 
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spaced to reduce harm.209 A similar approach may be taken in areas of 
demonstrated groundwater-surface water connectivity when unified 
administration of rights by priority becomes important.210 
In Montana, “controlled ground water areas” may be created for 
similar reasons, and the State possesses comparable authority to close or 
restrict withdrawals, regulate well spacing, and require mitigation in the 
event of harm to users.211 In Montana’s closed basins, where water 
supply is over-appropriated, the State requires that proposed groundwater 
withdrawals conduct a hydrogeologic assessment that analyzes surface 
water impacts.212 Where a “net depletion of surface water” will occur 
and cause an adverse impact to an appropriator, the law imposes a 
mitigation requirement that precludes new water uses unless and until 
suitable replacement waters can be found.213 The mitigation may be 
through aquifer recharge or replacement surface or groundwaters via the 
reallocation of existing water rights.214 
At the moment, neither State appears to be using these statutory 
mechanisms to squarely tackle the issue of CBM groundwater depletion 
of senior surface water rights. By articulating a starting place for 
integrated surface and groundwater management in the Basin,215 and 
informing it with the scientific measures discussed above, the Special 
Master can set Wyoming and Montana on a course that reduces the 
chances of further interstate disputes in the Basin and provides a 
meaningful, prospective remedy under the Compact. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Montana v. Wyoming offers a rich and rare opportunity to transform 
the relationship between CBM and prior appropriation. The Special 
Master has concluded that hydrologically connected groundwaters fall 
within the scope of the Yellowstone River Compact, and the U.S. 
 209 Id. § 41-3-915. 
 210 Id. § 41-3-916. 
 211 MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-506 (Westlaw 2011). Montana currently has such an area 
designated in part of the Powder River Basin, but controls are limited to remedying harm to 
groundwater well owners within a circle of influence around a CBM well—essentially paralleling 
the statutory remedy critiqued in Part III.B, supra. These controls are inadequate to address the full 
spectrum of senior rights requiring protection. 
 212 MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 85-2-360, -361 (Westlaw 2011). 
 213 Id. 
 214 Id. § 85-2-362. 
 215 “Integrated” suggests an approach where surface and groundwaters are managed as one 
resource to ensure that water is used according to priority. This does not necessarily mean that the 
States will jointly co-manage those waters, although each State will need to manage its water 
resources under the Compact according to certain mutually agreed upon practices and rules. 
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Supreme Court has held that the laws of prior appropriation imbue the 
parties’ expectations under the Compact. Based on these preliminary 
rulings, the country’s highest court is poised to illuminate the water law 
rules applicable to CBM groundwater withdrawals and to fashion a 
remedy that better hews to those rules. Important to that remedy will be 
the inclusion of all Compact water rights, a candid critique of the States’ 
current CBM regulations, and a call for certain basic steps that assure 
sound management practices of the surface and groundwaters affected by 
CBM production. With states throughout the West struggling with these 
very same issues, and seemingly unable to reach solutions on their own, 
the opportunity to improve CBM regulation starts but does not end with 
the Powder River Basin. 
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